Ravi Bansal
Duke University
Abstract:
In this paper we show that volatility news is essential for a coherent economic interpretation and measurement of the underlying risks in the economy, and that ignoring volatility can lead to substantial biases in the stochastic discount factor (SDF). We quantify and show that ignoring volatility can have first-order implications for the implied consumption innovations, the SDF, and asset returns. Furthermore, using a VAR based approach we document that accounting for volatility leads to a positive correlation between the return to human capital and the market, while this correlation is negative when volatility is ignored. Our volatility based asset pricing model captures well the levels and differences in the risk premia across value and size portfolios. We further show that accounting for volatility risks is important for correct economic interpretation of the assets’ exposure to the underlying sources of risks.
Date: December 20, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Thursday, December 15, 2011
19 December 2011: Fiscal Devaluations
Gita Gopinath
Harvard University
Abstract:
We show that even when the exchange rate cannot be devalued, a small set of conventional fiscal instruments can robustly replicate the real allocations attained under a nominal exchange rate devaluation in a standard New Keynesian open economy environment. We perform the analysis under alternative pricing assumptions -- producer or local currency pricing, along with nominal wage stickiness; under alternative asset market structures, and for anticipated and unanticipated devaluations. There are two types of fiscal policies equivalent to an exchange rate devaluation -- one, a uniform increase in import tariff and export subsidy, and two, an increase in value-added tax and a uniform reduction in payroll tax. When the devaluations are anticipated, these policies need to be supplemented with a reduction in consumption tax and an increase in income taxes. These policies have zero impact on fiscal revenues. In certain cases equivalence requires in addition a partial default on foreign bond holders. We discuss the issues of implementation of these policies, in particular, under the circumstances of a currency union.
Date: December 19, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Harvard University
Abstract:
We show that even when the exchange rate cannot be devalued, a small set of conventional fiscal instruments can robustly replicate the real allocations attained under a nominal exchange rate devaluation in a standard New Keynesian open economy environment. We perform the analysis under alternative pricing assumptions -- producer or local currency pricing, along with nominal wage stickiness; under alternative asset market structures, and for anticipated and unanticipated devaluations. There are two types of fiscal policies equivalent to an exchange rate devaluation -- one, a uniform increase in import tariff and export subsidy, and two, an increase in value-added tax and a uniform reduction in payroll tax. When the devaluations are anticipated, these policies need to be supplemented with a reduction in consumption tax and an increase in income taxes. These policies have zero impact on fiscal revenues. In certain cases equivalence requires in addition a partial default on foreign bond holders. We discuss the issues of implementation of these policies, in particular, under the circumstances of a currency union.
Date: December 19, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
19 December 2011: Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? How Much Impact does it have on Poverty?
Martin Ravallion
World Bank
Abstract:
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
stipulates up to 100 days of work to any household who wants it, at
wage rates set around the levels of the statutory minimum wage rates
for agricultural labor. If the scheme worked in practice the way it
is designed there would be no un-met demand for work on the scheme.
Anyone who wanted work would get it. Under certain conditions, such a
scheme would have a huge impact on poverty in India. But are those
conditions met in practice? Possibly not all those who say they want
this work would want 100 days. There may be un-met demand for work,
such that not everyone who wants it can get it. There may well be some
foregone income—some “deadweight loss” from taking up work on the
scheme. The full wage rate stipulated under the scheme might not be
received by workers. While the National Rural Employment Guarantee
scheme is probably the largest single anti-poverty program anywhere,
there has been very little rigorous evaluative research.
The presentation will study the performance of the scheme in one of
the India’s poorest states, Bihar, drawing on a forthcoming report
documenting results from a panel survey of 2,000 households in rural
Bihar 2009-10. A variety of data sources and methods are
employed—including both observational (econometric) and experimental
methods—to address the key questions about performance of the scheme
in Bihar. The results confirm the potential for this scheme to reduce
poverty but point to a number of specific performance issues that
impede realizing that potential in practice. The results reveal a
large in-met demand for work on the scheme in Bihar, and very low
awareness of what needs to be done to obtain work, and low
participation by poor people in decisions about the scheme. A
randomized awareness intervention using a specially designed fictional
movie is shown to impact awareness, and more so for certain key
sub-groups. Specific actionable areas for reform are identified. (The
report is written by Puja Dutta, Rinku Murgai, Martin Ravallion and
Dominique van de Walle).
Date: December 19, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org by by Friday, December 16
World Bank
Abstract:
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
stipulates up to 100 days of work to any household who wants it, at
wage rates set around the levels of the statutory minimum wage rates
for agricultural labor. If the scheme worked in practice the way it
is designed there would be no un-met demand for work on the scheme.
Anyone who wanted work would get it. Under certain conditions, such a
scheme would have a huge impact on poverty in India. But are those
conditions met in practice? Possibly not all those who say they want
this work would want 100 days. There may be un-met demand for work,
such that not everyone who wants it can get it. There may well be some
foregone income—some “deadweight loss” from taking up work on the
scheme. The full wage rate stipulated under the scheme might not be
received by workers. While the National Rural Employment Guarantee
scheme is probably the largest single anti-poverty program anywhere,
there has been very little rigorous evaluative research.
The presentation will study the performance of the scheme in one of
the India’s poorest states, Bihar, drawing on a forthcoming report
documenting results from a panel survey of 2,000 households in rural
Bihar 2009-10. A variety of data sources and methods are
employed—including both observational (econometric) and experimental
methods—to address the key questions about performance of the scheme
in Bihar. The results confirm the potential for this scheme to reduce
poverty but point to a number of specific performance issues that
impede realizing that potential in practice. The results reveal a
large in-met demand for work on the scheme in Bihar, and very low
awareness of what needs to be done to obtain work, and low
participation by poor people in decisions about the scheme. A
randomized awareness intervention using a specially designed fictional
movie is shown to impact awareness, and more so for certain key
sub-groups. Specific actionable areas for reform are identified. (The
report is written by Puja Dutta, Rinku Murgai, Martin Ravallion and
Dominique van de Walle).
Date: December 19, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org by by Friday, December 16
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
16 December 2011: The Globalization Paradox : Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can't Coexist
Dani Rodrik
Harvard University
Abstract:
The Seminar would focus around Professor Rodrik’s latest book, “The Globalization Paradox : Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can't Coexist" and would give us an opportunity to get a deeper insight into the dilemma surrounding globalization and the different notions of it carried by economists. Experts would also deliberate upon the future of globalization and how to attain balanced development as we confront today's global challenges in trade, finance, and labour markets.
Date: December 16, 2011
Time: 10:00 A.M.
Venue:
Federation House,
Tansen Marg,
New Delhi- 110 001(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Kindly confirm your participation to Ms Saloni J Mishra / Mr Anshumaan Sahni (Tel: 23765322, 23765084, 23487511 and 23487467; Fax: 23320714, 23320736; E-mail: saloni.jha@ficci.com).
Harvard University
Abstract:
The Seminar would focus around Professor Rodrik’s latest book, “The Globalization Paradox : Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can't Coexist" and would give us an opportunity to get a deeper insight into the dilemma surrounding globalization and the different notions of it carried by economists. Experts would also deliberate upon the future of globalization and how to attain balanced development as we confront today's global challenges in trade, finance, and labour markets.
Date: December 16, 2011
Time: 10:00 A.M.
Venue:
Federation House,
Tansen Marg,
New Delhi- 110 001(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Kindly confirm your participation to Ms Saloni J Mishra / Mr Anshumaan Sahni (Tel: 23765322, 23765084, 23487511 and 23487467; Fax: 23320714, 23320736; E-mail: saloni.jha@ficci.com).
9 December 2011: Managing India's Urban Spillovers: Land, Infrastructure, and Services
Somik Lall and Tara Vishwanath
World Bank
Abstract:
Urbanization is unfolding in India with 90 million people being added to urban areas since 2001 alongside urban physical growth which took off in places classified as census towns – which exhibit urban characteristics but not officially classified as such. How urbanization unfolds has implications for economic efficiency and equity. From an economic efficiency point of view, the important question is to identify where these transformations are taking place and whether productivity gains through agglomeration economies are being tapped. And from a spatial equity perspective, it is important to understand if the benefits of this transformation are spreading geographically. This presentation will focus on the pace and patterns of urbanization in India, identify factors that may influence efficiency of spatial transformation, and suggest options for policy based on relevant international experience. In unraveling potential constraints, this presentation will focus on land policies, services, infrastructure and connectivity.
Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org by Thursday, December 8
World Bank
Abstract:
Urbanization is unfolding in India with 90 million people being added to urban areas since 2001 alongside urban physical growth which took off in places classified as census towns – which exhibit urban characteristics but not officially classified as such. How urbanization unfolds has implications for economic efficiency and equity. From an economic efficiency point of view, the important question is to identify where these transformations are taking place and whether productivity gains through agglomeration economies are being tapped. And from a spatial equity perspective, it is important to understand if the benefits of this transformation are spreading geographically. This presentation will focus on the pace and patterns of urbanization in India, identify factors that may influence efficiency of spatial transformation, and suggest options for policy based on relevant international experience. In unraveling potential constraints, this presentation will focus on land policies, services, infrastructure and connectivity.
Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org by Thursday, December 8
Monday, December 5, 2011
14 December 2011: Why do People Vote the Way they do? Do People Change their Vote Based on the Information they get? Evidence from Delhi and Rajasthan
Rohini Pande
Harvard University
Abstract:
Nearly a quarter of the 543 elected members of the Indian Parliament have been charged with crimes, including rape and murder (Association for Democratic Reforms, 2009). Public services are often poor while public funds stay unutilised. The NGO Satark Nagrik Sangathan found that 53 of the 70 Members of the Delhi Legislative Assembly elected in 2008 had not fully used their local area development funds.
In this context, education campaigns for voters are being increasingly seen as a key method of empowering citizens in a democracy and demanding more effective leadership.
Date: December 14, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
View ISID Complex in a larger map
Harvard University
Abstract:
Nearly a quarter of the 543 elected members of the Indian Parliament have been charged with crimes, including rape and murder (Association for Democratic Reforms, 2009). Public services are often poor while public funds stay unutilised. The NGO Satark Nagrik Sangathan found that 53 of the 70 Members of the Delhi Legislative Assembly elected in 2008 had not fully used their local area development funds.
In this context, education campaigns for voters are being increasingly seen as a key method of empowering citizens in a democracy and demanding more effective leadership.
Date: December 14, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
View ISID Complex in a larger map
9 December 2011: How to Throw a Party: Multi-Agent Contracting with Type Dependent Externalities
Eyal Winter
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract:
We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents’ benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking of the agents, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities asymmetry.
Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract:
We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents’ benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking of the agents, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities asymmetry.
Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Friday, December 2, 2011
5 December 2011: Effect of Monetary Incentives on Institutional Deliveries: Evidence from the Janani Suraksha Yojna in India
Ambrish Dongre
Centre for Policy Research
Abstract:
This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the short term e ffects of the `Janani Suraksha Yojna' (Safe Motherhood Scheme), a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in India, launched in April 2005. Under the scheme, a woman delivering her child in a medical facility is provided monetary rewards.
My difference-in-difference estimation results indicate that in the initial one and a half years of its operation, the scheme did not have any eff ect on the disparity between the targeted and non- targeted states. In fact, the gap between the two widened in this period, albeit marginally. But beginning from 2007, the targeted states have shown much larger improvements in the institutional deliveries, leading to a dramatic decline in the gap between the targeted and the non-targeted states.
I also show that the convergence or differential improvement in access and availability of medical facilities are not driving my results.
Date: December 5, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Centre for Policy Research
Abstract:
This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the short term e ffects of the `Janani Suraksha Yojna' (Safe Motherhood Scheme), a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in India, launched in April 2005. Under the scheme, a woman delivering her child in a medical facility is provided monetary rewards.
My difference-in-difference estimation results indicate that in the initial one and a half years of its operation, the scheme did not have any eff ect on the disparity between the targeted and non- targeted states. In fact, the gap between the two widened in this period, albeit marginally. But beginning from 2007, the targeted states have shown much larger improvements in the institutional deliveries, leading to a dramatic decline in the gap between the targeted and the non-targeted states.
I also show that the convergence or differential improvement in access and availability of medical facilities are not driving my results.
Date: December 5, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Thursday, December 1, 2011
7 December 2011: Development Strategy in the 21st Century: Lessons from Korea and East Asia
Haider Khan
University of Denver
Abstract:
Prof Khan will explore the well-known Korean growth and development experience to glean some pertinent lessons for industrialization and development in the 21st century. His work lays out a number of strategic features of the Korean development experience, ranging from strategic openness to learning, innovation, and ultimately enhancing the standard of living for all citizens. What does the Korean case tell us about the form and function of desirable institutions that provide security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and strategically conceived integration with the world economy? How can domestic institutions help maintain macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance? In order to promote equitable growth, what institutions can supply social insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability?
Date: December 7, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664 or Ms Sadhana Singh (sadhanasingh@ncaer.org/011-2345-2617).
University of Denver
Abstract:
Prof Khan will explore the well-known Korean growth and development experience to glean some pertinent lessons for industrialization and development in the 21st century. His work lays out a number of strategic features of the Korean development experience, ranging from strategic openness to learning, innovation, and ultimately enhancing the standard of living for all citizens. What does the Korean case tell us about the form and function of desirable institutions that provide security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and strategically conceived integration with the world economy? How can domestic institutions help maintain macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance? In order to promote equitable growth, what institutions can supply social insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability?
Date: December 7, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664 or Ms Sadhana Singh (sadhanasingh@ncaer.org/011-2345-2617).
Wednesday, November 30, 2011
6 December 2011: Maternal Autonomy and the Education of the Subsequent Generation: Evidence from three Contrasting States in India
Uma Kambhampati
University of Reading
Abstract:
This paper makes a significant contribution on both conceptual and methodological fronts, in the analysis of the effect of maternal autonomy on school enrolment age of children in India. The school entry age is modelled using a discrete time duration model where maternal autonomy is entered as a latent characteristic, and allowed to be associated with various parental and household characteristics which also conditionally affect school entry age. The model identification is achieved by using proxy measures collected in the third round of the National Family Health Survey of India, on information relating to the economic, decision-making, physical and emotional autonomy of a woman. We concentrate on three very different states in India – Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. Our results indicate that female autonomy is not associated with socio-economic characteristics of the woman or her family in Kerala (except maternal education), while it is strongly correlated to these characteristics in both Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Secondly, while female autonomy is significant in influencing the school starting age in UP, it is less important in AP and not significant at all in Kerala.
Date: December 6, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Reading
Abstract:
This paper makes a significant contribution on both conceptual and methodological fronts, in the analysis of the effect of maternal autonomy on school enrolment age of children in India. The school entry age is modelled using a discrete time duration model where maternal autonomy is entered as a latent characteristic, and allowed to be associated with various parental and household characteristics which also conditionally affect school entry age. The model identification is achieved by using proxy measures collected in the third round of the National Family Health Survey of India, on information relating to the economic, decision-making, physical and emotional autonomy of a woman. We concentrate on three very different states in India – Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. Our results indicate that female autonomy is not associated with socio-economic characteristics of the woman or her family in Kerala (except maternal education), while it is strongly correlated to these characteristics in both Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Secondly, while female autonomy is significant in influencing the school starting age in UP, it is less important in AP and not significant at all in Kerala.
Date: December 6, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, November 28, 2011
2 December 2011: The Allocation of a Prize
Pradeep Dubey
State University of New York
Date: December 2, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
State University of New York
Date: December 2, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
30 November 2011: Bayesian Games with Contracts
Francoise Forges
University Paris-Dauphine
Abstract:
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can
achieve by signing (conditional) commitments before playing a Bayesian
game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and
interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game.
Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by
means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium
payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
Date: November 30, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University Paris-Dauphine
Abstract:
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can
achieve by signing (conditional) commitments before playing a Bayesian
game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and
interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game.
Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by
means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium
payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
Date: November 30, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
30 November 2011: Approval Voting and Arrow's Impossibiltiy Theorem
Philippe Mongin
HEC School of Management, Paris
Abstract:
Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting
theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian
framework of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it
with Arrow's impossibility theorem. This note explores these two
directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it
first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and
then shows that these properties are incompatible if the social
preference is also taken to be dichotomous.
The positive result improves on some existing characterizations of
approval voting in the literature, as well as on Arrow's and May's
classic analyses of voting on two alternatives. The negative result
corresponds to a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow's
impossibility theorem.
Date: November 30, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
HEC School of Management, Paris
Abstract:
Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting
theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian
framework of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it
with Arrow's impossibility theorem. This note explores these two
directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it
first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and
then shows that these properties are incompatible if the social
preference is also taken to be dichotomous.
The positive result improves on some existing characterizations of
approval voting in the literature, as well as on Arrow's and May's
classic analyses of voting on two alternatives. The negative result
corresponds to a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow's
impossibility theorem.
Date: November 30, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Friday, November 25, 2011
29 November 2011: Planning versus Reality: Politics of Land-use Change along the River Yamuna in Delhi
Alex Follmann
University of Cologne
Abstract:
The presentation will examine the dynamic land-use changes along the banks of the river Yamuna and the recent plans to create a biodiversity zone along the river in the context of Delhi’s transformation into a world-class city by 2021. Based on orders by the High Court of Delhi concerning illegal encroachments on the riverbed and their negative environmental impact on the Yamuna, almost all slum settlements have been demolished along the river in recent years. Simultaneously, urban (infrastructure) mega-projects like the Akshardham Temple, the Commonwealth Games Village, an IT office park and two metro depots have been developed on the floodplain regardless of their negative environmental impacts. The most recent plans for Delhi’s riverfront, however, aim to create a biodiversity zone all along the river focusing on green and recreational spaces. The presentation will outline the inconsistency of urban planning and the role of the courts with respect to environmental protection of the Yamuna floodplain. While removing slum settlements and farmers from the banks, developing large scale transportation infrastructure, planning parks and recreational spaces, the Yamuna still suffers from an inadequate flow of water (except during monsoon) and an extremely high degree of pollution. The talk will take a holistic approach to understand the challenges of urban environmental governance in fast growing mega-cities.
Date: November 29, 2011
Time: 03:45 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Cologne
Abstract:
The presentation will examine the dynamic land-use changes along the banks of the river Yamuna and the recent plans to create a biodiversity zone along the river in the context of Delhi’s transformation into a world-class city by 2021. Based on orders by the High Court of Delhi concerning illegal encroachments on the riverbed and their negative environmental impact on the Yamuna, almost all slum settlements have been demolished along the river in recent years. Simultaneously, urban (infrastructure) mega-projects like the Akshardham Temple, the Commonwealth Games Village, an IT office park and two metro depots have been developed on the floodplain regardless of their negative environmental impacts. The most recent plans for Delhi’s riverfront, however, aim to create a biodiversity zone all along the river focusing on green and recreational spaces. The presentation will outline the inconsistency of urban planning and the role of the courts with respect to environmental protection of the Yamuna floodplain. While removing slum settlements and farmers from the banks, developing large scale transportation infrastructure, planning parks and recreational spaces, the Yamuna still suffers from an inadequate flow of water (except during monsoon) and an extremely high degree of pollution. The talk will take a holistic approach to understand the challenges of urban environmental governance in fast growing mega-cities.
Date: November 29, 2011
Time: 03:45 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
28th November 2011: Outward FDI from Brazil, China, and India
Adhip Chaudhuri
Georgetown University
Abstract:
This research, first, demonstrates that Outward FDIs from Brazil, China, and India are very much in accordance with the Investment Development Path predicted by John Dunning thirty years ago. Secondly, an analysis of the data shows that Chinese Outward FDI is mostly South-South, India's mostly South-North, and Brazil's Outward FDI more balanced between South-South and South-North. Finally, it is argued that the strong Country-Specific Advantages of Brazil are what made their Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) come to exercise strong Firm-Specific Advantages in international competition. On the other hand, the strong Country-Specific Advantages of China have not yet been translated into strong Firm-Specific Advantages. In contrast, Indian MNEs are exercising strong Firm-Specific Advantages, in spite of weak Country-Specific Advantages.
Date: November 28, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium, Ground Floor
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Georgetown University
Abstract:
This research, first, demonstrates that Outward FDIs from Brazil, China, and India are very much in accordance with the Investment Development Path predicted by John Dunning thirty years ago. Secondly, an analysis of the data shows that Chinese Outward FDI is mostly South-South, India's mostly South-North, and Brazil's Outward FDI more balanced between South-South and South-North. Finally, it is argued that the strong Country-Specific Advantages of Brazil are what made their Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) come to exercise strong Firm-Specific Advantages in international competition. On the other hand, the strong Country-Specific Advantages of China have not yet been translated into strong Firm-Specific Advantages. In contrast, Indian MNEs are exercising strong Firm-Specific Advantages, in spite of weak Country-Specific Advantages.
Date: November 28, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium, Ground Floor
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
30 November 2011: Learning by Doing: Skills and Jobs in Urban Ghana
Kim Lehrer
University of Oxford
Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between skills and job characteristics using a panel dataset of individuals in urban Ghana. The paper analyzes on-the-job skills acquisition and explores the link between general mathematics skills and jobs which involve handling of money. These mathematics skills are important not only in the workplace but also in general. The relationship between skills and jobs is identified by examining individuals who changed jobs between survey rounds. In the cross-sectional analysis, the authors exploit variation in the data by investigating the entire sample of employed individuals while controlling for education, cognitive ability, and the fact whether the individual’s primary work activity is self-employment or wage employment. They argue that the process of job choice in Ghana allows them to identify causal impacts. They found that money handling is positively associated with higher maths skills for both men and women. However, while for men, working in money handling intense jobs results in improvements in their basic and practical maths skills, for women the effect appears to be the development of more complex and advanced mathematics skills. These results are not driven by differences in mathematics scores by self-employment or wage employment and are robust to changes in the classification of money handling jobs. Finally, an interesting finding of the paper is that working in a job involving the handling of money is positively associated with higher maths scores only among men who have 8–10 years of education and among women with more than 10 years of schooling. This indicates that individuals at the low end of the distribution of years of education do not acquire mathematics skills through money handling jobs. It is only the approximately 40 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women who are already quite highly educated in the Ghanaian context who acquire these skills on the job.
Date: November 30, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
University of Oxford
Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between skills and job characteristics using a panel dataset of individuals in urban Ghana. The paper analyzes on-the-job skills acquisition and explores the link between general mathematics skills and jobs which involve handling of money. These mathematics skills are important not only in the workplace but also in general. The relationship between skills and jobs is identified by examining individuals who changed jobs between survey rounds. In the cross-sectional analysis, the authors exploit variation in the data by investigating the entire sample of employed individuals while controlling for education, cognitive ability, and the fact whether the individual’s primary work activity is self-employment or wage employment. They argue that the process of job choice in Ghana allows them to identify causal impacts. They found that money handling is positively associated with higher maths skills for both men and women. However, while for men, working in money handling intense jobs results in improvements in their basic and practical maths skills, for women the effect appears to be the development of more complex and advanced mathematics skills. These results are not driven by differences in mathematics scores by self-employment or wage employment and are robust to changes in the classification of money handling jobs. Finally, an interesting finding of the paper is that working in a job involving the handling of money is positively associated with higher maths scores only among men who have 8–10 years of education and among women with more than 10 years of schooling. This indicates that individuals at the low end of the distribution of years of education do not acquire mathematics skills through money handling jobs. It is only the approximately 40 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women who are already quite highly educated in the Ghanaian context who acquire these skills on the job.
Date: November 30, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
24 November 2011: Endogenous Market Structures and International Trade
Federico Etro
University of Venice
Abstract:
I apply the endogenous market structures approach to international
trade. When markets are characterized by strategic interactions and
endogenous entry, opening up to trade decreases the markups, reduces
the local number of rms and increases their production, with a
positive competition effect on welfare. This is shown in traditional
models with linear and isoelastic demand under competition in
quantities and prices, and in a 2x2x2 model which nests the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Krugman model and the Brander-Markusen
model. Finally, I characterize the optimal import tari for a domestic
market and the optimal production subsity for an integrated market in
the presence of endogenous entry of international rms.
Date: November 24, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Venice
Abstract:
I apply the endogenous market structures approach to international
trade. When markets are characterized by strategic interactions and
endogenous entry, opening up to trade decreases the markups, reduces
the local number of rms and increases their production, with a
positive competition effect on welfare. This is shown in traditional
models with linear and isoelastic demand under competition in
quantities and prices, and in a 2x2x2 model which nests the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Krugman model and the Brander-Markusen
model. Finally, I characterize the optimal import tari for a domestic
market and the optimal production subsity for an integrated market in
the presence of endogenous entry of international rms.
Date: November 24, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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9 December 2011: Inflation: Expectations, Targets, and the Institutional Framework for Monetary Policy
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium, Ground Floor
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Goethe University
Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium, Ground Floor
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
25 November 2011: Environmental Regulation in the Presence of an Informal Sector
Soham Baksi
University of Winnipeg
Abstract:
We analyze the efficacy of environmental regulation in the presence of
an endogenous informal sector. Firms in an imperfectly competitive
formal sector produce a final good using a polluting intermediate
good. The firms can either produce the intermediate good or purchase
it from a price-taking informal sector. An environmental regulator
sets the emission intensity of the intermediate good that all formal
sector firms implement honestly but informal sector firms seek, and
are sometimes able, to evade.
We show that, depending on the stringency of the regulation and its
enforcement, the informal sector can act as a source of pollution
leakage. Stricter regulation can increase or decrease total pollution,
and may even have a non-monotonic impact. Further, price
discrimination by the formal sector, when it purchases the
intermediate good from the informal sector, can worsen regulatory
compliance by the informal sector and lead to lower welfare.
Date: November 25, 2011
Time: 02:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Winnipeg
Abstract:
We analyze the efficacy of environmental regulation in the presence of
an endogenous informal sector. Firms in an imperfectly competitive
formal sector produce a final good using a polluting intermediate
good. The firms can either produce the intermediate good or purchase
it from a price-taking informal sector. An environmental regulator
sets the emission intensity of the intermediate good that all formal
sector firms implement honestly but informal sector firms seek, and
are sometimes able, to evade.
We show that, depending on the stringency of the regulation and its
enforcement, the informal sector can act as a source of pollution
leakage. Stricter regulation can increase or decrease total pollution,
and may even have a non-monotonic impact. Further, price
discrimination by the formal sector, when it purchases the
intermediate good from the informal sector, can worsen regulatory
compliance by the informal sector and lead to lower welfare.
Date: November 25, 2011
Time: 02:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
1, 2, 7, 8, 9 December 2011: Natural Rates and Filtering Problems in Reduced-Form and Structural Models
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Date: December 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall (Ground Floor), New Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Those who are interested may please register for the course online at http://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/courses.html. Also, please make sure to bring a laptop with a working MATLAB and Dynare. This is a pre-requisite for attending this course.
Goethe University
Date: December 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall (Ground Floor), New Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Those who are interested may please register for the course online at http://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/courses.html. Also, please make sure to bring a laptop with a working MATLAB and Dynare. This is a pre-requisite for attending this course.
Monday, November 21, 2011
24, 25, 28, 29, 30 November 2011: Financial Frictions and Crises in General Equilibrium Models
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Date: November 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall (Ground Floor), New Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Those who are interested may please register for the course online at http://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/courses.html. Also, please make sure to bring a laptop with a working MATLAB and Dynare. This is a pre-requisite for attending this course.
Goethe University
Date: November 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall (Ground Floor), New Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Those who are interested may please register for the course online at http://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/courses.html. Also, please make sure to bring a laptop with a working MATLAB and Dynare. This is a pre-requisite for attending this course.
Monday, November 14, 2011
18 November 2011: Dismantling the Legacy of Caste: Affirmative Action in Indian Higher Education
Surendrakumar Bagde
Ministry of Finance
Abstract:
Public policy in modern Indian features affirmative action-policies intended to reduce persistent inequality stemming from a centuries-old caste structure. We study the effects of one such affirmative action program. Specifically, we examine the consequences of an admissions policy to engineering colleges that fixes percentage quotas, common across 214 colleges, for each of six disadvantaged castes. We have obtained access to exceptionally rich data for study of this affirmative action programdata that include the test scores that were used to administer admissions decision rules, as well as detailed independent ability metrics. Our analysis indicates that for targeted students the program has significant and substantial positive effects both on college attendance and first-year academic achievement.
Date: November 18, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Ministry of Finance
Abstract:
Public policy in modern Indian features affirmative action-policies intended to reduce persistent inequality stemming from a centuries-old caste structure. We study the effects of one such affirmative action program. Specifically, we examine the consequences of an admissions policy to engineering colleges that fixes percentage quotas, common across 214 colleges, for each of six disadvantaged castes. We have obtained access to exceptionally rich data for study of this affirmative action programdata that include the test scores that were used to administer admissions decision rules, as well as detailed independent ability metrics. Our analysis indicates that for targeted students the program has significant and substantial positive effects both on college attendance and first-year academic achievement.
Date: November 18, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
16 November 2011: General Equilibrium, Wariness and Bubbles
Aloisio Araujo
IMPA Brazil
Abstract:
We say that a consumer is wary if she overlooks gains but not losses
in remote sets of dates or states. We formulate this by requiring
preferences to be upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous and
Bewley's result on existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium whose prices
are not necessarily countably additive holds. We relate wariness to
some concepts studied in decision theory like lack of myopia and
ambiguity aversion. Wary infinite lived agents are not impatient, have
optimality conditions, in the form of weaker transversality
conditions, that allow them to be creditors at infinity and bubbles
occur for positive net supply assets completing the markets. In a two
date economy, with infinite states, wary agents are not myopic and
bubbles occur, as asset prices do not have to equal the series of
returns weighted by state prices. A large class of efficient
allocations can only be implemented with asset bubbles. Pessimistic
attitudes lead agents to overvalue assets or durable goods with
hedging properties, like gold.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
IMPA Brazil
Abstract:
We say that a consumer is wary if she overlooks gains but not losses
in remote sets of dates or states. We formulate this by requiring
preferences to be upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous and
Bewley's result on existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium whose prices
are not necessarily countably additive holds. We relate wariness to
some concepts studied in decision theory like lack of myopia and
ambiguity aversion. Wary infinite lived agents are not impatient, have
optimality conditions, in the form of weaker transversality
conditions, that allow them to be creditors at infinity and bubbles
occur for positive net supply assets completing the markets. In a two
date economy, with infinite states, wary agents are not myopic and
bubbles occur, as asset prices do not have to equal the series of
returns weighted by state prices. A large class of efficient
allocations can only be implemented with asset bubbles. Pessimistic
attitudes lead agents to overvalue assets or durable goods with
hedging properties, like gold.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
16 November 2011: The World Under Pressure: How China and India are Influencing the Global Economy and Environment
Carl Dahlman
Georgetown University
Abstract:
The rapid rise of China and India is reshaping our global economic and environmental systems--raising major issues of stability, governance, and sustainability. This book develops a framework that shows the interdependence between economic size, trade, finance, technology, environment, security, and global governance. This framework provides data on the speed of global power shifts, traces the implications for nations worldwide and offers insights into our most pressing concerns.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Georgetown University
Abstract:
The rapid rise of China and India is reshaping our global economic and environmental systems--raising major issues of stability, governance, and sustainability. This book develops a framework that shows the interdependence between economic size, trade, finance, technology, environment, security, and global governance. This framework provides data on the speed of global power shifts, traces the implications for nations worldwide and offers insights into our most pressing concerns.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
11 November 2011: Remember when it Rained: The Illusiveness of Gender
Laura Zimmermann
University of Michigan
Abstract:
Indian girls have significantly lower school enrollment rates than
boys. Anecdotal evidence suggests that gender-differential treatment
is the main explanation, but empirical support is often weak and
seemingly inconsistent. I propose that this may be due to age-specific
forms of discrimination. I analyze school enrollment using rainfall
shocks, a plausibly exogenous source of income variation. Girls's
school enrollment is more vulnerable to rainfall shocks than that of
boys, with 6-10 year olds driving these effects. This is consistent
with young girls being out of school because boys's education is
prioritized, whereas older girls suffer from low perceived benefits of
education.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Michigan
Abstract:
Indian girls have significantly lower school enrollment rates than
boys. Anecdotal evidence suggests that gender-differential treatment
is the main explanation, but empirical support is often weak and
seemingly inconsistent. I propose that this may be due to age-specific
forms of discrimination. I analyze school enrollment using rainfall
shocks, a plausibly exogenous source of income variation. Girls's
school enrollment is more vulnerable to rainfall shocks than that of
boys, with 6-10 year olds driving these effects. This is consistent
with young girls being out of school because boys's education is
prioritized, whereas older girls suffer from low perceived benefits of
education.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
11 November 2011: The Dark Side of the Vote: Misleading Signals, Social Information, and Information Aggregation through Majority Voting
Rebecca Morton
New York University
Abstract:
We present experiments on information aggregation through majority voting in which subjects can receive misleading signals. We argue that when signals are possibly misleading, majority voting can result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We also investigate the interaction between different types of social information and the bias due to misleading signals. We find that voting fails to correct for misleading signals and that group decisions can be biased as a consequence. However, we do not find a significant difference between individual and group decision-making in these cases. Yet, social information on prior choices makes group decision-making worse when signals are misleading. Theoretically, social information on consequences should alleviate the bias due to misleading signals; however, we find that in our experiments subjects appear to ignore such information and it fails to reduce the bias.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
New York University
Abstract:
We present experiments on information aggregation through majority voting in which subjects can receive misleading signals. We argue that when signals are possibly misleading, majority voting can result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We also investigate the interaction between different types of social information and the bias due to misleading signals. We find that voting fails to correct for misleading signals and that group decisions can be biased as a consequence. However, we do not find a significant difference between individual and group decision-making in these cases. Yet, social information on prior choices makes group decision-making worse when signals are misleading. Theoretically, social information on consequences should alleviate the bias due to misleading signals; however, we find that in our experiments subjects appear to ignore such information and it fails to reduce the bias.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Friday, November 4, 2011
11 November 2011: Japan: In Decline or Recovery?
Sheila A. Smith
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
8 November 2011: It's a boy! Women and Non-Monetary Benefits from a Son in India
Laura Zimmermann
University of Michigan
Abstract:
It is well-documented that in a number of countries unnaturally few
girls are born relative to boys. Explanations have focused on a range
of potential reasons, including economic and cultural benefits from
having a son. Households are usually treated as monolithic entities,
however, and the motivations of particular household members are
understudied. In contrast, this paper looks at a potential benefit
mothers derive from giving birth to a boy - an improvement in their
position within the household. I analyze this hypothesis using
households with young first-borns from a nationally representative
Indian dataset. The results suggest that women do indeed gain in
non-monetary terms: Having a boy rather than a girl leads to increased
joint household decision-making powers and to more freedom in carrying
out activities without the explicit consent of other household
members. This implies that even young women may have a self-interest
in practicing son preference.
Date: November 8, 2011
Time: 02:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Michigan
Abstract:
It is well-documented that in a number of countries unnaturally few
girls are born relative to boys. Explanations have focused on a range
of potential reasons, including economic and cultural benefits from
having a son. Households are usually treated as monolithic entities,
however, and the motivations of particular household members are
understudied. In contrast, this paper looks at a potential benefit
mothers derive from giving birth to a boy - an improvement in their
position within the household. I analyze this hypothesis using
households with young first-borns from a nationally representative
Indian dataset. The results suggest that women do indeed gain in
non-monetary terms: Having a boy rather than a girl leads to increased
joint household decision-making powers and to more freedom in carrying
out activities without the explicit consent of other household
members. This implies that even young women may have a self-interest
in practicing son preference.
Date: November 8, 2011
Time: 02:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, October 31, 2011
4 November 2011: Economic Transformation and Learning: Insights for India
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University
Date: November 4, 2011
Time: 06:30 P.M.
Venue:
Indian International Centre (Multipurpose Hall)
40, Max Mueller Marg,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Columbia University
Date: November 4, 2011
Time: 06:30 P.M.
Venue:
Indian International Centre (Multipurpose Hall)
40, Max Mueller Marg,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
3 November 2011: Sectoral Dislocations and Long Run Crises
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University
Date: November 3, 2011
Time: 02:15 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Columbia University
Date: November 3, 2011
Time: 02:15 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Friday, October 21, 2011
21 October 2011: Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index without the Efficiency Axiom
Ori Haimanko
Ben-Gurion University
Abstract:
We show that the Shapley-Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the efficiency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker requirement that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy.
Date: October 21, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Ben-Gurion University
Abstract:
We show that the Shapley-Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the efficiency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker requirement that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy.
Date: October 21, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, October 17, 2011
20 October 2011: Public Capital, Growth and Welfare: Public Policy Implications for India
Pierre-Richard Agénor
University of Manchester
Abstract:
The persistence of poverty and lack of progress in human development has led policymakers to put renewed emphasis on policies aimed at promoting economic efficiency and improving the productivity of the poor, generating income-earning capabilities and creating opportunities for using them productively. This has led to a greater priority on investments in public infrastructure. Recent analytical and empirical research has highlighted the fact that public infrastructure may spur growth through a variety of other channels, beyond its effects on the productivity of private inputs and the rate of return on private capital, including through an impact on health and education outcomes. Accounting for the externalities associated with infrastructure may thus be essential in designing and quantifying growth and human development strategies. Professor Agenor and discussants will highlight, analytically and empirically, the channels through which public capital investment may feed into human development outcomes in health, education, and women's time allocation, among others, and will suggest implications for public policies in the Indian context.
Date: October 20, 2011
Time: 05:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Savita Dhingra at sdhingra@worldbank.org or Tanusree Talukdar, ttalukdar@worldbank.org
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Manchester
Abstract:
The persistence of poverty and lack of progress in human development has led policymakers to put renewed emphasis on policies aimed at promoting economic efficiency and improving the productivity of the poor, generating income-earning capabilities and creating opportunities for using them productively. This has led to a greater priority on investments in public infrastructure. Recent analytical and empirical research has highlighted the fact that public infrastructure may spur growth through a variety of other channels, beyond its effects on the productivity of private inputs and the rate of return on private capital, including through an impact on health and education outcomes. Accounting for the externalities associated with infrastructure may thus be essential in designing and quantifying growth and human development strategies. Professor Agenor and discussants will highlight, analytically and empirically, the channels through which public capital investment may feed into human development outcomes in health, education, and women's time allocation, among others, and will suggest implications for public policies in the Indian context.
Date: October 20, 2011
Time: 05:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Savita Dhingra at sdhingra@worldbank.org or Tanusree Talukdar, ttalukdar@worldbank.org
Location:
View Larger Map
19 October 2011: A Ranking Method Based on Handicaps
Gabrielle Demange
Paris School of Economics
Abstract:
Ranking systems are becoming increasingly important in many areas, in the Web environment and academic life for instance. The paper introduces and characterizes a new method based on the notion of 'handicaps'.
Date: October 19, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Paris School of Economics
Abstract:
Ranking systems are becoming increasingly important in many areas, in the Web environment and academic life for instance. The paper introduces and characterizes a new method based on the notion of 'handicaps'.
Date: October 19, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Thursday, October 13, 2011
20 October 2011: Export Versus FDI in Services
Rudrani Bhattacharya
NIPFP
Date: October 20, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
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NIPFP
Date: October 20, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, October 11, 2011
17 October 2011: Celebrating 25 Years of India-ADB Partnership - Eminent Persons’ Forum
Organised by:
Asian Development Bank
Abstract:
The rapid rise of Asia in the last three decades of the 20th century represents one of the most remarkable episodes of economic development in history. The first decade of the 21st Century has seen a further deepening of the ‘Asian growth story’, leading many to label this century as the Asian Century. However, an Asian Century is not preordained. Having successfully ignited growth, Asia faces the challenge of sustaining growth and ensuring that it is inclusive. Moreover, the Asian Century must not be Asia's alone. It must be a century of shared prosperity globally.
What are the actions and agendas – nationally, regionally, and globally – that Asia's leaders must adopt if Asians are to take their place among the ranks of the affluent? How should Asia's countries engage with one another and globally? At the Eminent Persons’ Forum statesmen and experts from Asia will provide their perspectives on these questions in three sets of panel discussions.
Speakers at the Forum include Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Honorable Finance Minister of India; Mr. Haruhiko Kuroda, President of ADB; His Excellency Mr. Cesar V. Purisima, Secretary for Finance, Government of Republic of the Philippines; His Excellency Mr. Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Finance Minister II of Malaysia; Dr. Shankar Acharya, Honorary Professor, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations; Dr. Kaushik Basu, Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance; Professor Arvind Panagariya, Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy, Columbia University; Dr. Changyong Rhee, Chief Economist, ADB; Ambassador Kyung Wook Hur, Korea's Ambassador to the OECD; Mr. Hidetoshi Nishimura, Executive Director, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia; and Dr. Than Nyun, Former Chairman of the Myanmar Public Service Commission.
Date: October 17, 2011
Time: 09:30 A.M.
Venue:
Kamal Mahal,
ITC Maurya,
Diplomatic Enclave,
Sardar Patel Marg,
New Delhi 110 021 (India)
Location:
View Larger Map
Asian Development Bank
Abstract:
The rapid rise of Asia in the last three decades of the 20th century represents one of the most remarkable episodes of economic development in history. The first decade of the 21st Century has seen a further deepening of the ‘Asian growth story’, leading many to label this century as the Asian Century. However, an Asian Century is not preordained. Having successfully ignited growth, Asia faces the challenge of sustaining growth and ensuring that it is inclusive. Moreover, the Asian Century must not be Asia's alone. It must be a century of shared prosperity globally.
What are the actions and agendas – nationally, regionally, and globally – that Asia's leaders must adopt if Asians are to take their place among the ranks of the affluent? How should Asia's countries engage with one another and globally? At the Eminent Persons’ Forum statesmen and experts from Asia will provide their perspectives on these questions in three sets of panel discussions.
Speakers at the Forum include Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Honorable Finance Minister of India; Mr. Haruhiko Kuroda, President of ADB; His Excellency Mr. Cesar V. Purisima, Secretary for Finance, Government of Republic of the Philippines; His Excellency Mr. Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Finance Minister II of Malaysia; Dr. Shankar Acharya, Honorary Professor, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations; Dr. Kaushik Basu, Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance; Professor Arvind Panagariya, Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy, Columbia University; Dr. Changyong Rhee, Chief Economist, ADB; Ambassador Kyung Wook Hur, Korea's Ambassador to the OECD; Mr. Hidetoshi Nishimura, Executive Director, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia; and Dr. Than Nyun, Former Chairman of the Myanmar Public Service Commission.
Date: October 17, 2011
Time: 09:30 A.M.
Venue:
Kamal Mahal,
ITC Maurya,
Diplomatic Enclave,
Sardar Patel Marg,
New Delhi 110 021 (India)
Location:
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14 October 2011: In-play Football Prediction
Nils Rudi
INSEAD
Abstract:
For in-play football prediction, we consider a model based on Poisson arrival rates of goals. We prove that for a given pre-game trinomial predictive distribution of the result (i.e., home, tie and away), there exist a unique pair of Poisson arrival rates which correspond to it. This facilities the base model of in-play prediction with an absolute minimum requirement of data analysis. This result is extended to non-stationary arrival rates and state (score difference) dependent arrival rates. We perform an empirical investigation of the models using a large set of data from multiple leagues, and contrast the results with those of logistic regression. In the presentation, I will also talk about multiple research opportunities in football, and current work we are doing with an extensive data set from the English Premier League.
Date: October 14, 2011
Time: 11:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
INSEAD
Abstract:
For in-play football prediction, we consider a model based on Poisson arrival rates of goals. We prove that for a given pre-game trinomial predictive distribution of the result (i.e., home, tie and away), there exist a unique pair of Poisson arrival rates which correspond to it. This facilities the base model of in-play prediction with an absolute minimum requirement of data analysis. This result is extended to non-stationary arrival rates and state (score difference) dependent arrival rates. We perform an empirical investigation of the models using a large set of data from multiple leagues, and contrast the results with those of logistic regression. In the presentation, I will also talk about multiple research opportunities in football, and current work we are doing with an extensive data set from the English Premier League.
Date: October 14, 2011
Time: 11:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, October 7, 2011
12 October 2011: Role of Information Technology Sector in Explaining Acceleration of India’s Economic Growth
Jyoti Vig
University of Minnesota
Abstract:
This paper attempts to study the role of information technology (IT) in explaining the structural features of the Indian economy such as an increasing share of services in GDP and an increase in contribution of services in the acceleration in output per worker since 1993–2004. Using a multi-sector framework with three final goods and one intermediate good (stylized as IT) the author tries to find out if this framework can reproduce the above structural features. Simulating greater absorption of IT in the economy the author observes that her benchmark model allows for a close fit of GDP and sector outputs for the period 1991 to 2003. However, the model severally undershoots thereafter. To mimic the impact of greater IT absorption in the domestic economy the author applies a parametric experiment and call it the “Jorgenson Effect”. She asks whether this new economy can account for the sharp acceleration in GDP and sectoral outputs observed in the benchmark. Though she observes a closer fit of the data, the new economy still undershoots growth for the period 2003–09.
Date: October 12, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Minnesota
Abstract:
This paper attempts to study the role of information technology (IT) in explaining the structural features of the Indian economy such as an increasing share of services in GDP and an increase in contribution of services in the acceleration in output per worker since 1993–2004. Using a multi-sector framework with three final goods and one intermediate good (stylized as IT) the author tries to find out if this framework can reproduce the above structural features. Simulating greater absorption of IT in the economy the author observes that her benchmark model allows for a close fit of GDP and sector outputs for the period 1991 to 2003. However, the model severally undershoots thereafter. To mimic the impact of greater IT absorption in the domestic economy the author applies a parametric experiment and call it the “Jorgenson Effect”. She asks whether this new economy can account for the sharp acceleration in GDP and sectoral outputs observed in the benchmark. Though she observes a closer fit of the data, the new economy still undershoots growth for the period 2003–09.
Date: October 12, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
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14 October 2011: Stepping Up Skills for More Jobs and Productivity: A Framework for Analysis
Ariel Fiszbein
The World Bank
Abstract:
Skills are increasingly being recognized as a bottleneck for employment, productivity and growth. Both developed and developing countries are launching ambitious strategies and programmes for skills development. This presentation will propose a framework to conceptualise skills development strategies that recognises the diversity of skills demanded, the incentives and behaviours of individuals and firms, and the evidence on effective programmes.
Date: October 14, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
View Larger Map
The World Bank
Abstract:
Skills are increasingly being recognized as a bottleneck for employment, productivity and growth. Both developed and developing countries are launching ambitious strategies and programmes for skills development. This presentation will propose a framework to conceptualise skills development strategies that recognises the diversity of skills demanded, the incentives and behaviours of individuals and firms, and the evidence on effective programmes.
Date: October 14, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
View Larger Map
13 October 2011: How Social Norms Matter for Development Effectiveness: Women's Autonomy and Subjective Well-Being in Orissa, India
Thomas de Hoop
3ie
Abstract:
This paper serves to go beyond the obvious but relatively vague notion that context matters for the effectiveness of development programs. We present quasi-experimental evidence that, on average, self-help group membership does not affect subjective well-being in Orissa, India. Furthermore, we present evidence indicating that self-help group membership has positive impacts on women's autonomy. Our results at the same time reveal that subjective well-being sharply declines for those members whose newly gained autonomy meets with relatively conservative gender norms among non-members. The findings demonstrate that self-help groups have a higher impact if social norms are conducive. We thus demonstrate that the heterogeneity in the impact estimates that is related to context becomes partly predictable by the measurement of social norms. This suggests that we can learn something about external validity from the derivation of heterogeneous impacts in a single setting only.
Date: October 13, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
View ISID Complex in a larger map
3ie
Abstract:
This paper serves to go beyond the obvious but relatively vague notion that context matters for the effectiveness of development programs. We present quasi-experimental evidence that, on average, self-help group membership does not affect subjective well-being in Orissa, India. Furthermore, we present evidence indicating that self-help group membership has positive impacts on women's autonomy. Our results at the same time reveal that subjective well-being sharply declines for those members whose newly gained autonomy meets with relatively conservative gender norms among non-members. The findings demonstrate that self-help groups have a higher impact if social norms are conducive. We thus demonstrate that the heterogeneity in the impact estimates that is related to context becomes partly predictable by the measurement of social norms. This suggests that we can learn something about external validity from the derivation of heterogeneous impacts in a single setting only.
Date: October 13, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
View ISID Complex in a larger map
13 October 2011: In-play Football Prediction
Nils Rudi
INSEAD
Abstract:
For in-play football prediction, we consider a model based on Poisson arrival rates of goals. We prove that for a given pre-game trinomial predictive distribution of the result (i.e., home, tie and away), there exist a unique pair of Poisson arrival rates which correspond to it. This facilities the base model of in-play prediction with an absolute minimum requirement of data analysis. This result is extended to non-stationary arrival rates and state (score difference) dependent arrival rates. We perform an empirical investigation of the models using a large set of data from multiple leagues, and contrast the results with those of logistic regression.
Date: October 13, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
INSEAD
Abstract:
For in-play football prediction, we consider a model based on Poisson arrival rates of goals. We prove that for a given pre-game trinomial predictive distribution of the result (i.e., home, tie and away), there exist a unique pair of Poisson arrival rates which correspond to it. This facilities the base model of in-play prediction with an absolute minimum requirement of data analysis. This result is extended to non-stationary arrival rates and state (score difference) dependent arrival rates. We perform an empirical investigation of the models using a large set of data from multiple leagues, and contrast the results with those of logistic regression.
Date: October 13, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, September 27, 2011
30 September 2011: Asset Fire Sales and Purchases and the International Transmission of Funding Shocks
Tarun Ramadorai
University of Oxford
Abstract:
We uncover a new channel through which shocks are transmitted across international markets. Investor flows to funds domiciled in developed markets force significant changes in their portfolio allocations to emerging markets. These forced trades affect equity prices, correlations between emerging markets, and the developed-market betas of emerging markets. These funding-driven fire sale effects are related to, but distinct from those arising purely from high fund holdings or high overlapping ownership of emerging markets in fund portfolios. A simple model and calibration exercise highlight the importance to these findings of 'push' effects from funds' domicile countries, and 'co-ownership spillover' between markets with overlapping fund ownership.
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Oxford
Abstract:
We uncover a new channel through which shocks are transmitted across international markets. Investor flows to funds domiciled in developed markets force significant changes in their portfolio allocations to emerging markets. These forced trades affect equity prices, correlations between emerging markets, and the developed-market betas of emerging markets. These funding-driven fire sale effects are related to, but distinct from those arising purely from high fund holdings or high overlapping ownership of emerging markets in fund portfolios. A simple model and calibration exercise highlight the importance to these findings of 'push' effects from funds' domicile countries, and 'co-ownership spillover' between markets with overlapping fund ownership.
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, September 26, 2011
29 September 2011: Bounded Intertemporal Rationality: Apparent Impatience among South African Pension Recipients
Dean Spears
Princeton University
Abstract:
Behavior that responds most to sooner costs and benefits is often interpreted as evidence of impatient time preference. However, apparent impatience could instead be caused by choice technology that finds optimizing over temporally nearer consequences easier. This paper illustrates this possibility with a simple model and applies its theory of bounded intertemporal rationality to the intra-monthly consumption puzzle. An applied model explains stylized facts that theories of time preference cannot. Novel predictions are verified in a field experiment among pension recipients in Cape Town, South Africa. Monthly consumption cycles are concentrated among participants with low cognitive resources and unpredictable circumstances.
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Princeton University
Abstract:
Behavior that responds most to sooner costs and benefits is often interpreted as evidence of impatient time preference. However, apparent impatience could instead be caused by choice technology that finds optimizing over temporally nearer consequences easier. This paper illustrates this possibility with a simple model and applies its theory of bounded intertemporal rationality to the intra-monthly consumption puzzle. An applied model explains stylized facts that theories of time preference cannot. Novel predictions are verified in a field experiment among pension recipients in Cape Town, South Africa. Monthly consumption cycles are concentrated among participants with low cognitive resources and unpredictable circumstances.
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, September 23, 2011
28 September 2011: Height and cognitive achievement among Indian children
Dean Spears
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists, demographers and medical researchers are accumulating persuasive evidence of lasting consequences of early-life health and net nutrition for life-long economic, cognitive, and health outcomes.
The paper documents and describes an association between child height and cognitive achievement in India using India Human Development Survey (IHDS). Taller children perform better on average on tests of cognitive achievement, in part because of differences in early-life health and net nutrition. Recent research documenting this height – achievement slope has primarily focused on rich countries. Using the India Human Development Survey, a representative sample of 40,000 households which matches anthropometric data to learning tests, this paper documents a height-achievement slope among Indian children. The height-achievement slope in India is more than twice as steep as in the U.S. An earlier survey interviewed some IHDS children’s household eleven years before. Including matched early-life control variables reduces the apparent effect of height, but does not eliminate it; water, sanitation and hygiene maybe particularly important for children’s outcomes. Being one standard deviation taller is associated with being 5 percentage points more likely to be able to write, a slope that falls only to 3.4 percentage points controlling for a long list of contemporary and early-life conditions.
Date: September 28, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
View Larger Map
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists, demographers and medical researchers are accumulating persuasive evidence of lasting consequences of early-life health and net nutrition for life-long economic, cognitive, and health outcomes.
The paper documents and describes an association between child height and cognitive achievement in India using India Human Development Survey (IHDS). Taller children perform better on average on tests of cognitive achievement, in part because of differences in early-life health and net nutrition. Recent research documenting this height – achievement slope has primarily focused on rich countries. Using the India Human Development Survey, a representative sample of 40,000 households which matches anthropometric data to learning tests, this paper documents a height-achievement slope among Indian children. The height-achievement slope in India is more than twice as steep as in the U.S. An earlier survey interviewed some IHDS children’s household eleven years before. Including matched early-life control variables reduces the apparent effect of height, but does not eliminate it; water, sanitation and hygiene maybe particularly important for children’s outcomes. Being one standard deviation taller is associated with being 5 percentage points more likely to be able to write, a slope that falls only to 3.4 percentage points controlling for a long list of contemporary and early-life conditions.
Date: September 28, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
View Larger Map
27 September 2011: New Thinking on Building the Corporate Bond Market
Sanjay Banerji
University of Nottingham Business School
Abstract:
Abstract: The paper will review the existing theories of asymmetric information that strongly argues issuance of debt as a superior method of financing that tends to alleviate agency problems. It will also establish the case for a corporate bond market as a means of issuing debt even in the presence of bank loans as providers of debt to firms. Finally, we also argue that the exercise of instituting the corporate bond market will be futile unless it is designed in such a way to minimize information, liquidity and bankruptcy costs.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Nottingham Business School
Abstract:
Abstract: The paper will review the existing theories of asymmetric information that strongly argues issuance of debt as a superior method of financing that tends to alleviate agency problems. It will also establish the case for a corporate bond market as a means of issuing debt even in the presence of bank loans as providers of debt to firms. Finally, we also argue that the exercise of instituting the corporate bond market will be futile unless it is designed in such a way to minimize information, liquidity and bankruptcy costs.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
26 September 2011: RSBY – New Frontiers
Anil Swarup
Ministry of Labour and Employment
Date: September 26, 2011
Time: 06:00 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
GIZ office India
21, Jor Bagh
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Ministry of Labour and Employment
Date: September 26, 2011
Time: 06:00 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
GIZ office India
21, Jor Bagh
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
30 September 2011: Fault Lines in Participatory Democracy
Aruna Roy
Social Activist and Founder, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 05:00 P.M.
Venue:
Auditorium
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
Teen Murthi House
New Delhi-110011(INDIA)
Location:
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Social Activist and Founder, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 05:00 P.M.
Venue:
Auditorium
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
Teen Murthi House
New Delhi-110011(INDIA)
Location:
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Wednesday, September 21, 2011
27 September 2011: Politics and Protesting Publics in Urban India Reflections from the 2006 Sealing Drive and the World of New Delhi’s Traders
Diya Mehra
Centre de Sciences Humaines
Abstract:
In 2006, the Supreme Court ordered that anywhere between 50,000-500,000 shops in Delhi would have to close as they were illegal operating commercial establishments in residential areas. This paper examines the large oppositional campaign put up by Delhi’s traders in protest against the judgment, and what came to be known as the Sealing Drives. The paper uses this example to bring attention to a vast intermediate urban/economic world, betwixt and between the elite and the poor, that has largely been ignored in the existing urban literature on contemporary urban change. It shows how this intermediate world is both enmeshed in the development of a world class city and lifestyles, even as increasingly threatened by the arrival of larger and powerful capital. From the perspective of the traders, the Sealing Drive was a conspiracy between government and new capital; one cemented by high-level corruption and aimed at evicting smaller scale production from the city. In opposition and through their campaign the traders sought to defer the sealing order by deploying nationalist, and anti-colonial repertoires (symbols, discourses, practices) of performative street based politics, spread by harnessing urban memories, affective distress, vernacular understanding of state morality, media coverage, images and cinematic tropes, seeking to interpellate a vast and dispersed oppositional public. What the campaign makes apparent is that the contemporary Indian urban comprises a multitude of urban publics, articulated at the intersection of a number of different dynamics, and in a state of emergent and fluid political formation.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 03:45 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall,
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Centre de Sciences Humaines
Abstract:
In 2006, the Supreme Court ordered that anywhere between 50,000-500,000 shops in Delhi would have to close as they were illegal operating commercial establishments in residential areas. This paper examines the large oppositional campaign put up by Delhi’s traders in protest against the judgment, and what came to be known as the Sealing Drives. The paper uses this example to bring attention to a vast intermediate urban/economic world, betwixt and between the elite and the poor, that has largely been ignored in the existing urban literature on contemporary urban change. It shows how this intermediate world is both enmeshed in the development of a world class city and lifestyles, even as increasingly threatened by the arrival of larger and powerful capital. From the perspective of the traders, the Sealing Drive was a conspiracy between government and new capital; one cemented by high-level corruption and aimed at evicting smaller scale production from the city. In opposition and through their campaign the traders sought to defer the sealing order by deploying nationalist, and anti-colonial repertoires (symbols, discourses, practices) of performative street based politics, spread by harnessing urban memories, affective distress, vernacular understanding of state morality, media coverage, images and cinematic tropes, seeking to interpellate a vast and dispersed oppositional public. What the campaign makes apparent is that the contemporary Indian urban comprises a multitude of urban publics, articulated at the intersection of a number of different dynamics, and in a state of emergent and fluid political formation.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 03:45 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall,
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
23 September 2011: Election Outcomes and the Poor: Evidence from the Consumption of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India
Sharad Tandon
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Abstract:
Using Indian parliamentary elections in 1998 and 1999, this paper investigates whether election outcomes affect consumption of households belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST's), the poorest Indian households that constitute nearly a quarter of the total population. Using arguably exogenous variation in the party affiliation of successful candidates introduced by close election outcomes, this paper finds that expenditure of households belonging to SC/ST's significantly increased in regions where candidates sympathetic to the groups were successful. These findings demonstrate that election outcomes can significantly impact a large number of the poorest households.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Abstract:
Using Indian parliamentary elections in 1998 and 1999, this paper investigates whether election outcomes affect consumption of households belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST's), the poorest Indian households that constitute nearly a quarter of the total population. Using arguably exogenous variation in the party affiliation of successful candidates introduced by close election outcomes, this paper finds that expenditure of households belonging to SC/ST's significantly increased in regions where candidates sympathetic to the groups were successful. These findings demonstrate that election outcomes can significantly impact a large number of the poorest households.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
29 September 2011: Contagion in International Financial Markets
Tarun Ramadorai
University of Oxford
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Oxford
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, September 19, 2011
23 September 2011: Dual Economies or Dual Livelihoods? Short-Term Migration from Rural India and Non-Agricultural Employment
Diane Coffey
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists have long thought of dual economies, one rural, agricultural and one urban, non-agricultural. Development then entails the permanent movement of households out of agriculture into non-agriculture. More recently, there is considerable evidence suggesting that labour migration from South Asian villages is not only common but also temporary and for short periods of time.
The paper discusses results from new survey data that helps illuminate how Indian rural, agricultural households take advantage of urban, non-agricultural employment opportunities through short-term migration. The sample comprises 700 households based in 70 villages in rural Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh. The data also includes in-depth interviews with 2,224 adults in these households to learn about their migration histories. The data suggest that short-term migration is an important and repeated income-generating strategy in this population, is almost universal among young men, and is extremely common among young women. Migration is costly in the deprivation experienced while working away from home, but seems to carry little risk of not finding work in urban spot labour markets, which pays high wages compared to less common labour work near the village. Besides detailing the migration experience of the surveyed adults, the work stresses the changes in the nature of migration since the 1990s. The dataset is also unique in exploring the experiences of children who migrate, and of those left behind while their parents migrate.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists have long thought of dual economies, one rural, agricultural and one urban, non-agricultural. Development then entails the permanent movement of households out of agriculture into non-agriculture. More recently, there is considerable evidence suggesting that labour migration from South Asian villages is not only common but also temporary and for short periods of time.
The paper discusses results from new survey data that helps illuminate how Indian rural, agricultural households take advantage of urban, non-agricultural employment opportunities through short-term migration. The sample comprises 700 households based in 70 villages in rural Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh. The data also includes in-depth interviews with 2,224 adults in these households to learn about their migration histories. The data suggest that short-term migration is an important and repeated income-generating strategy in this population, is almost universal among young men, and is extremely common among young women. Migration is costly in the deprivation experienced while working away from home, but seems to carry little risk of not finding work in urban spot labour markets, which pays high wages compared to less common labour work near the village. Besides detailing the migration experience of the surveyed adults, the work stresses the changes in the nature of migration since the 1990s. The dataset is also unique in exploring the experiences of children who migrate, and of those left behind while their parents migrate.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Thursday, September 15, 2011
22 September 2011: Performance of the PDS: Evidence from Secondary Data and the Field
Reetika Khera
Indian Institute of Technology
Abstract:
Looking beyond national averages at state level indicators, one finds that the PDS is witnessing a revival in several states. Based on secondary data from the NSS, it looks at rates of "diversion" of grain from the PDS over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 period. Given the large variations in state-level performance on key parameters such as entitlements, diversion rates, quality of grain, accessibility and so on, one finds that it is misleading to talk about the PDS in terms of national averages. The results of a nine-state field study of the PDS undertaken in June 2011 further substantiate the revival of the PDS in several states. Some explanations for why the PDS functions in some states and is languishing in others are offered. I will also report on respondents views on cash transfers as an alternative to the PDS, and why they preferred one or the other.
Date: September 22, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Indian Institute of Technology
Abstract:
Looking beyond national averages at state level indicators, one finds that the PDS is witnessing a revival in several states. Based on secondary data from the NSS, it looks at rates of "diversion" of grain from the PDS over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 period. Given the large variations in state-level performance on key parameters such as entitlements, diversion rates, quality of grain, accessibility and so on, one finds that it is misleading to talk about the PDS in terms of national averages. The results of a nine-state field study of the PDS undertaken in June 2011 further substantiate the revival of the PDS in several states. Some explanations for why the PDS functions in some states and is languishing in others are offered. I will also report on respondents views on cash transfers as an alternative to the PDS, and why they preferred one or the other.
Date: September 22, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, September 13, 2011
16 September 2011: Professional Advice from Randomly Transparent Committees
Saptarshi P. Ghosh
University of Birmingham
Abstract:
This paper studies voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret committee where voting profiles get `leaked' to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on truthful (or informative) voting and the social welfare from committee decisions. We show that for informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient to have both random transparency and the unanimity voting rule provided that the common prior is not too informative and the transparency probability is intermediate. We then show that no committee that maximises social welfare can enforce informative voting, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable. We then show that with a low prior (the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any unanimous committee.
Date: September 16, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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University of Birmingham
Abstract:
This paper studies voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret committee where voting profiles get `leaked' to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on truthful (or informative) voting and the social welfare from committee decisions. We show that for informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient to have both random transparency and the unanimity voting rule provided that the common prior is not too informative and the transparency probability is intermediate. We then show that no committee that maximises social welfare can enforce informative voting, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable. We then show that with a low prior (the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any unanimous committee.
Date: September 16, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, September 9, 2011
15 September 2011: Have Patience, Its Good
Amit Goyal
Indian Statistical Institute
Abstract:
In this paper we model a consumer who is ex ante unaware of his preferences over the set of alternatives and who can learn his preference by trying those alternatives one by one. He has a discount factor which prevents him from experimenting forever. Higher the patience level of the consumer, bigger will be the experimentation period and the more he will learn about his preferences. We then introduce firms in the model which will provide these alternatives with the aim to maximize profits. This paper is an attempt to answer how is this number of alternatives provided related with the average patience level of the agents in the economy.
Date: September 15, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Indian Statistical Institute
Abstract:
In this paper we model a consumer who is ex ante unaware of his preferences over the set of alternatives and who can learn his preference by trying those alternatives one by one. He has a discount factor which prevents him from experimenting forever. Higher the patience level of the consumer, bigger will be the experimentation period and the more he will learn about his preferences. We then introduce firms in the model which will provide these alternatives with the aim to maximize profits. This paper is an attempt to answer how is this number of alternatives provided related with the average patience level of the agents in the economy.
Date: September 15, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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