Thursday, December 15, 2011

20 December 2011: Volatility, the Macroeconomy and Asset Prices

Ravi Bansal
Duke University

Abstract:
In this paper we show that volatility news is essential for a coherent economic interpretation and measurement of the underlying risks in the economy, and that ignoring volatility can lead to substantial biases in the stochastic discount factor (SDF). We quantify and show that ignoring volatility can have first-order implications for the implied consumption innovations, the SDF, and asset returns. Furthermore, using a VAR based approach we document that accounting for volatility leads to a positive correlation between the return to human capital and the market, while this correlation is negative when volatility is ignored. Our volatility based asset pricing model captures well the levels and differences in the risk premia across value and size portfolios. We further show that accounting for volatility risks is important for correct economic interpretation of the assets’ exposure to the underlying sources of risks.

Date: December 20, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.

Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)

Location:

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19 December 2011: Fiscal Devaluations

Gita Gopinath
Harvard University

Abstract:
We show that even when the exchange rate cannot be devalued, a small set of conventional fiscal instruments can robustly replicate the real allocations attained under a nominal exchange rate devaluation in a standard New Keynesian open economy environment. We perform the analysis under alternative pricing assumptions -- producer or local currency pricing, along with nominal wage stickiness; under alternative asset market structures, and for anticipated and unanticipated devaluations. There are two types of fiscal policies equivalent to an exchange rate devaluation -- one, a uniform increase in import tariff and export subsidy, and two, an increase in value-added tax and a uniform reduction in payroll tax. When the devaluations are anticipated, these policies need to be supplemented with a reduction in consumption tax and an increase in income taxes. These policies have zero impact on fiscal revenues. In certain cases equivalence requires in addition a partial default on foreign bond holders. We discuss the issues of implementation of these policies, in particular, under the circumstances of a currency union.

Date: December 19, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.

Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)

Location:

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19 December 2011: Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? How Much Impact does it have on Poverty?

Martin Ravallion
World Bank

Abstract:
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
stipulates up to 100 days of work to any household who wants it, at
wage rates set around the levels of the statutory minimum wage rates
for agricultural labor. If the scheme worked in practice the way it
is designed there would be no un-met demand for work on the scheme.
Anyone who wanted work would get it. Under certain conditions, such a
scheme would have a huge impact on poverty in India. But are those
conditions met in practice? Possibly not all those who say they want
this work would want 100 days. There may be un-met demand for work,
such that not everyone who wants it can get it. There may well be some
foregone income—some “deadweight loss” from taking up work on the
scheme. The full wage rate stipulated under the scheme might not be
received by workers. While the National Rural Employment Guarantee
scheme is probably the largest single anti-poverty program anywhere,
there has been very little rigorous evaluative research.

The presentation will study the performance of the scheme in one of
the India’s poorest states, Bihar, drawing on a forthcoming report
documenting results from a panel survey of 2,000 households in rural
Bihar 2009-10. A variety of data sources and methods are
employed—including both observational (econometric) and experimental
methods—to address the key questions about performance of the scheme
in Bihar. The results confirm the potential for this scheme to reduce
poverty but point to a number of specific performance issues that
impede realizing that potential in practice. The results reveal a
large in-met demand for work on the scheme in Bihar, and very low
awareness of what needs to be done to obtain work, and low
participation by poor people in decisions about the scheme. A
randomized awareness intervention using a specially designed fictional
movie is shown to impact awareness, and more so for certain key
sub-groups. Specific actionable areas for reform are identified. (The
report is written by Puja Dutta, Rinku Murgai, Martin Ravallion and
Dominique van de Walle).

Date: December 19, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.

Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)

Location:

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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org by by Friday, December 16

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

16 December 2011: The Globalization Paradox : Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can't Coexist

Dani Rodrik
Harvard University

Abstract:
The Seminar would focus around Professor Rodrik’s latest book, “The Globalization Paradox : Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can't Coexist" and would give us an opportunity to get a deeper insight into the dilemma surrounding globalization and the different notions of it carried by economists. Experts would also deliberate upon the future of globalization and how to attain balanced development as we confront today's global challenges in trade, finance, and labour markets.

Date: December 16, 2011
Time: 10:00 A.M.

Venue:
Federation House,
Tansen Marg,
New Delhi- 110 001(INDIA)

Location:

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Note:
Kindly confirm your participation to Ms Saloni J Mishra / Mr Anshumaan Sahni (Tel: 23765322, 23765084, 23487511 and 23487467; Fax: 23320714, 23320736; E-mail: saloni.jha@ficci.com).

9 December 2011: Managing India's Urban Spillovers: Land, Infrastructure, and Services

Somik Lall and Tara Vishwanath
World Bank

Abstract:
Urbanization is unfolding in India with 90 million people being added to urban areas since 2001 alongside urban physical growth which took off in places classified as census towns – which exhibit urban characteristics but not officially classified as such. How urbanization unfolds has implications for economic efficiency and equity. From an economic efficiency point of view, the important question is to identify where these transformations are taking place and whether productivity gains through agglomeration economies are being tapped. And from a spatial equity perspective, it is important to understand if the benefits of this transformation are spreading geographically. This presentation will focus on the pace and patterns of urbanization in India, identify factors that may influence efficiency of spatial transformation, and suggest options for policy based on relevant international experience. In unraveling potential constraints, this presentation will focus on land policies, services, infrastructure and connectivity.

Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.

Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)

Location:

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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org by Thursday, December 8

Monday, December 5, 2011

14 December 2011: Why do People Vote the Way they do? Do People Change their Vote Based on the Information they get? Evidence from Delhi and Rajasthan

Rohini Pande
Harvard University

Abstract:
Nearly a quarter of the 543 elected members of the Indian Parliament have been charged with crimes, including rape and murder (Association for Democratic Reforms, 2009). Public services are often poor while public funds stay unutilised. The NGO Satark Nagrik Sangathan found that 53 of the 70 Members of the Delhi Legislative Assembly elected in 2008 had not fully used their local area development funds.

In this context, education campaigns for voters are being increasingly seen as a key method of empowering citizens in a democracy and demanding more effective leadership.

Date: December 14, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)

Location:

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9 December 2011: How to Throw a Party: Multi-Agent Contracting with Type Dependent Externalities

Eyal Winter
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract:
We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents’ benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking of the agents, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities asymmetry.

Date: December 9, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)

Location:

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Friday, December 2, 2011

5 December 2011: Effect of Monetary Incentives on Institutional Deliveries: Evidence from the Janani Suraksha Yojna in India

Ambrish Dongre
Centre for Policy Research

Abstract:
This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the short term e ffects of the `Janani Suraksha Yojna' (Safe Motherhood Scheme), a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in India, launched in April 2005. Under the scheme, a woman delivering her child in a medical facility is provided monetary rewards.

My difference-in-difference estimation results indicate that in the initial one and a half years of its operation, the scheme did not have any eff ect on the disparity between the targeted and non- targeted states. In fact, the gap between the two widened in this period, albeit marginally. But beginning from 2007, the targeted states have shown much larger improvements in the institutional deliveries, leading to a dramatic decline in the gap between the targeted and the non-targeted states.

I also show that the convergence or differential improvement in access and availability of medical facilities are not driving my results.

Date: December 5, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Conference Hall
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)

Location:

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Thursday, December 1, 2011

7 December 2011: Development Strategy in the 21st Century: Lessons from Korea and East Asia

Haider Khan
University of Denver

Abstract:
Prof Khan will explore the well-known Korean growth and development experience to glean some pertinent lessons for industrialization and development in the 21st century. His work lays out a number of strategic features of the Korean development experience, ranging from strategic openness to learning, innovation, and ultimately enhancing the standard of living for all citizens. What does the Korean case tell us about the form and function of desirable institutions that provide security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and strategically conceived integration with the world economy? How can domestic institutions help maintain macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance? In order to promote equitable growth, what institutions can supply social insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability?

Date: December 7, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.

Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)

Location:

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Note:
For queries, please contact Ms Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664 or Ms Sadhana Singh (sadhanasingh@ncaer.org/011-2345-2617).