Something to Complain About: How Minority Representatives Overcome Ethnic Differences
M.R. Sharan, Center for Global Development
Discussant:
Sabyasachi Das, Ashoka University
Vimal Balasubramaniam, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
We study the costs of ethnic differences between local politicians and examine ways to mitigate them. Using data from over 100,000 local politicians in India, we establish – via a regression discontinuity design – that delivery of key public goods suffers when ethnic minority (low-caste) representatives govern under non-minority (high-caste) representatives. We then study an institutional innovation that mitigates these adverse consequences. In our setting, local politicians can file complaints with the higher bureaucracy under a formal complaints technology. We establish that low-caste politicians use the technology, filing over twice as many complaints when exogenously paired with high-caste superiors. Does filing complaints improve outcomes, though? We run a large field experiment involving 1629 low-caste representatives where we randomize offers to file complaints on their behalf. Treated jurisdictions see a 26%rise in public good projects, accounting for 79% of the initial gap in provision, with positive spillovers onto neighbouring jurisdictions.
Organised by
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
Date: November 5, 2020
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Note:
To receive login details for the Webinar, please register for the event here.
M.R. Sharan, Center for Global Development
Discussant:
Sabyasachi Das, Ashoka University
Vimal Balasubramaniam, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
We study the costs of ethnic differences between local politicians and examine ways to mitigate them. Using data from over 100,000 local politicians in India, we establish – via a regression discontinuity design – that delivery of key public goods suffers when ethnic minority (low-caste) representatives govern under non-minority (high-caste) representatives. We then study an institutional innovation that mitigates these adverse consequences. In our setting, local politicians can file complaints with the higher bureaucracy under a formal complaints technology. We establish that low-caste politicians use the technology, filing over twice as many complaints when exogenously paired with high-caste superiors. Does filing complaints improve outcomes, though? We run a large field experiment involving 1629 low-caste representatives where we randomize offers to file complaints on their behalf. Treated jurisdictions see a 26%rise in public good projects, accounting for 79% of the initial gap in provision, with positive spillovers onto neighbouring jurisdictions.
Organised by
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
Date: November 5, 2020
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Note:
To receive login details for the Webinar, please register for the event here.
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