Howard White
3ie
Abstract:
The drive to demonstrate results is leading to an increased focus on impact evaluation. There has been a substantial rise in the use of ‘large n’ experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluations. But what can be done when there are insufficient units of assignment to apply statistical tests to determine the difference in outcomes between the treatment and comparison group? The need for such ‘small n’ approaches can arise when investigating one or a few cases, such as capacity building in a single organisation or a policy introduced at the national level, or possibly when an intervention has significant heterogeneity, with different recipients receiving different forms of support. This presentation will discuss some of the methodologies proposed for tackling causal inference in small n cases, including Realist Evaluation, Contribution Analysis, Outcome Mapping and Most Significant Change. Dr. White examines the possibility of drawing out common elements from these different methodologies and developing an integrated framework for small n analysis.
Date: February 1, 2012
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
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Monday, January 30, 2012
Monday, January 23, 2012
2 February 2012: Institutions, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows
Rahul Mukherjee
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Abstract:
Countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets
and exhibit concentrated corporate ownership. An equilibrium business
cycle model of international capital flows with corporate governance
frictions between outside and insider investors explains both
phenomena. Investment dynamics under insider control leads relative
dividend and labor income for outsiders to be more negatively
correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Consequently,
outsiders hold more domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. I
provide empirical evidence on this hedging demand. Concentrated
ownership arises because international diversification through the
sale of domestic assets by insiders is penalized by lower stock market
valuation.
Date: February 2, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Abstract:
Countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets
and exhibit concentrated corporate ownership. An equilibrium business
cycle model of international capital flows with corporate governance
frictions between outside and insider investors explains both
phenomena. Investment dynamics under insider control leads relative
dividend and labor income for outsiders to be more negatively
correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Consequently,
outsiders hold more domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. I
provide empirical evidence on this hedging demand. Concentrated
ownership arises because international diversification through the
sale of domestic assets by insiders is penalized by lower stock market
valuation.
Date: February 2, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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27 January 2012: Commodity Bundling in Government Securities Auctions
Samita Sareen
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond
auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper
argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely
prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer
imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and
compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data
set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to
show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the
issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond
auctions.
Date: January 27, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond
auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper
argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely
prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer
imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and
compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data
set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to
show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the
issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond
auctions.
Date: January 27, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
19 January 2012: Commodity Bundling in Government Securities Auctions: An Analysis of the Primary Dealer Model in Canada
Samita Sareen
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond auctions.
Date: January 19, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond auctions.
Date: January 19, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, January 16, 2012
20 January 2012: Monetary Policy Switching to Avoid a Liquidity Trap
Siddhartha Chattopadhyay
IIT Kharagpur
Abstract:
We propose a monetary-policy-switching Taylor Rule, which would allow the economy to avoid a liquidity trap. In the event of a demand shock, large enough to send the nominal interest rate below zero under a Taylor Rule with a fixed long-run inflation target, the monetary authority switches to a higher short-run inflation target which decays toward the long-run target over time. If the short-run target is sufficiently persistent, then the increase in inflationary expectations is large enough to raise inflation and output even though the nominal interest rate does not fall below zero. The switching regime imparts an inflation bias to policy, but avoids indeterminacy created by the fixed nominal interest rate in a liquidity trap.
Date: January 20, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
IIT Kharagpur
Abstract:
We propose a monetary-policy-switching Taylor Rule, which would allow the economy to avoid a liquidity trap. In the event of a demand shock, large enough to send the nominal interest rate below zero under a Taylor Rule with a fixed long-run inflation target, the monetary authority switches to a higher short-run inflation target which decays toward the long-run target over time. If the short-run target is sufficiently persistent, then the increase in inflationary expectations is large enough to raise inflation and output even though the nominal interest rate does not fall below zero. The switching regime imparts an inflation bias to policy, but avoids indeterminacy created by the fixed nominal interest rate in a liquidity trap.
Date: January 20, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Thursday, January 12, 2012
13 January 2012: Bailouts and Financial Fragility
Todd Keister
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Abstract:
How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a "bailout" distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may, in addition, leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Abstract:
How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a "bailout" distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may, in addition, leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
12 January 2012: Corruption in India: When Piety is not Enough
Pranab Bardhan
University of California
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
Department of Economics (Lecture Theatre),
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of California
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
Department of Economics (Lecture Theatre),
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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