Monday, January 23, 2012

27 January 2012: Commodity Bundling in Government Securities Auctions

Samita Sareen
Berkeley Research Group, New York

Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond
auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper
argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely
prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer
imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and
compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data
set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to
show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the
issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond

Date: January 27, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)


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