Monday, November 4, 2019

8 November 2019: TRIPS, Patents, and Drug Prices in India

Bhaven Sampat
Columbia University and NBER

Organised by
The Centre for Development Economics and Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

This paper examines the effects of product patents on drug prices and competition in India. Several previous analyses have found only negligible effects of patents on prices and competition in the post-TRIPS era, citing inadequate implementation and unique aspects of Indian Patent Law such as Section 3(d) as potential explanations for these surprising findings. We argue that the limited impact thus far instead reflects another aspect of TRIPS implementation: the decision to not allow patents with pre-1995 priority dates. We demonstrate that the main patents on most drugs approved until very recently (and the majority of drugs covered by previous analyses) are pre-1995 priority. When we focus on drugs fully covered by the TRIPS regime - those whose primary (compound) patent has a post-1995 priority date — we find much larger effects of patents on prices and competition. We argue that these price/competition effects are what we should expect in the long-run steady state, once the long shadow of implementation fades. We discuss implications for prices, access, and innovation in India and globally, and for empirical research on the globalization of patent protection.

Date: November 8, 2019
Time: 03:05 P.M.

Amex Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)


No comments:

Post a Comment