Aditi Dimri
Universite catholique de Louvain and Paris School of Economics
Abstract:
This paper sheds new light on, if and how, the cultural norm of living with parent-in-laws after marriage affects the outcomes of the daughter-in-law in the household. To isolate the causal effect of the presence of an in-law in this highly endogenous setting, I use the death of the father-in-law or mother-in-law as an exogenous event changing the household composition. Using household level panel data, I estimate a double-difference model comparing groups that experience a death and those that do not between 2005 and 2012. First, I explore the allocation of household decision-making-say amongst the four members based on a framework allowing for gender spheres, and generational & spousal transfers. I find that the daughter-in-law is the worst-off, however, contrary to anecdotal evidence this is because of the household composition leading to stronger gender roles and patriarchy. Second, I find improvement in objective outcomes of the daughter-in-law like having cash in hand, her self-reported health, and frequency of visits to natal family. Such understandings of household decision-making can be important for targeting policies better, and shed light on the role of norms in determining socio-economic outcomes.
Date: January 29, 2016
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Universite catholique de Louvain and Paris School of Economics
Abstract:
This paper sheds new light on, if and how, the cultural norm of living with parent-in-laws after marriage affects the outcomes of the daughter-in-law in the household. To isolate the causal effect of the presence of an in-law in this highly endogenous setting, I use the death of the father-in-law or mother-in-law as an exogenous event changing the household composition. Using household level panel data, I estimate a double-difference model comparing groups that experience a death and those that do not between 2005 and 2012. First, I explore the allocation of household decision-making-say amongst the four members based on a framework allowing for gender spheres, and generational & spousal transfers. I find that the daughter-in-law is the worst-off, however, contrary to anecdotal evidence this is because of the household composition leading to stronger gender roles and patriarchy. Second, I find improvement in objective outcomes of the daughter-in-law like having cash in hand, her self-reported health, and frequency of visits to natal family. Such understandings of household decision-making can be important for targeting policies better, and shed light on the role of norms in determining socio-economic outcomes.
Date: January 29, 2016
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
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