A two-person inﬁnite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary
behavioral types singles out a particular solution and appears to support some axiomatic treatments in the early literature. Perturbing the model with a slightly broader class of behavioral types that allows the informed player to delay making his initial oﬀer again achieves powerful equilibrium reﬁnement. But there is substantial delay to agreement, and predictions depend continuously on the ex ante probabilities of the patient and impatient types of the informed player, counter to what the literature suggests.
Date: March 27, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
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