Bertha Briceno
World Bank and
Sumeet Patil
NEERMAN
Abstract:
In India, the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) provides
technical assistance to the Government of India’s (GoI) Total
Sanitation Campaign (TSC) in two States: Himachal Pradesh and Madhya
Pradesh. TSC is an ambitious countrywide, scaled-up rural sanitation
program launched by the GoI in 1999. As part of the learning
objectives, WSP is conducting a randomized-controlled trial impact
evaluation (IE) study in order to study the health and welfare impacts
of sanitation improvements on the final beneficiaries. This report
summarizes the findings of the baseline and community surveys
conducted in Madhya Pradesh (MP), India, and is part of a series of
papers analyzing the baseline data from countries where the rural
sanitation program is being implemented (Indonesia and Tanzania).
Date: February 2, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Sapna John at sjohn4@worldbank.org.
Monday, January 30, 2012
3 February 2012: Fire Sale FDI or Business as Usual
Rahul Mukherjee
Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies
Date: February 3, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies
Date: February 3, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
3 February 2012: Information Technology and Indian Economy
Jyoti Vig
University of Minnesota
Abstract:
This paper attempts to study the impact of information technology on
explaining the structural features of the Indian economy such as an
increasing share of services in GDP and an increase in contribution of
services in the acceleration in output per worker since 1993-2004
(Bosworth and Collins 2008). Using a multi-sector framework with three
final goods and one intermediate good (stylized as information
technology) we ask if this framework can reproduce the above
structural features.
Simulating greater absorption of IT in the economy (Jorgenson 2001) we
observe that our benchmark model allows for a close fit of GDP and
sector outputs for the period 1991 to 2003, however the model
severally undershoots for the period thereafter. To mimic the impact
of greater IT absorption in the domestic economy we apply a parametric
experiment and call it the “Jorgenson Effect”. We ask whether this new
economy can account for the sharp acceleration in GDP and sectoral
outputs observed in the benchmark. Though we observe a closer fit of
the data, the new economy still undershoots growth for the period
2003-2009.
Date: February 3, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Minnesota
Abstract:
This paper attempts to study the impact of information technology on
explaining the structural features of the Indian economy such as an
increasing share of services in GDP and an increase in contribution of
services in the acceleration in output per worker since 1993-2004
(Bosworth and Collins 2008). Using a multi-sector framework with three
final goods and one intermediate good (stylized as information
technology) we ask if this framework can reproduce the above
structural features.
Simulating greater absorption of IT in the economy (Jorgenson 2001) we
observe that our benchmark model allows for a close fit of GDP and
sector outputs for the period 1991 to 2003, however the model
severally undershoots for the period thereafter. To mimic the impact
of greater IT absorption in the domestic economy we apply a parametric
experiment and call it the “Jorgenson Effect”. We ask whether this new
economy can account for the sharp acceleration in GDP and sectoral
outputs observed in the benchmark. Though we observe a closer fit of
the data, the new economy still undershoots growth for the period
2003-2009.
Date: February 3, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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1 February 2012: Addressing Attribution of Cause and Effect in Small n Impact Evaluations: Towards an Integrated Framework
Howard White
3ie
Abstract:
The drive to demonstrate results is leading to an increased focus on impact evaluation. There has been a substantial rise in the use of ‘large n’ experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluations. But what can be done when there are insufficient units of assignment to apply statistical tests to determine the difference in outcomes between the treatment and comparison group? The need for such ‘small n’ approaches can arise when investigating one or a few cases, such as capacity building in a single organisation or a policy introduced at the national level, or possibly when an intervention has significant heterogeneity, with different recipients receiving different forms of support. This presentation will discuss some of the methodologies proposed for tackling causal inference in small n cases, including Realist Evaluation, Contribution Analysis, Outcome Mapping and Most Significant Change. Dr. White examines the possibility of drawing out common elements from these different methodologies and developing an integrated framework for small n analysis.
Date: February 1, 2012
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
View ISID Complex in a larger map
3ie
Abstract:
The drive to demonstrate results is leading to an increased focus on impact evaluation. There has been a substantial rise in the use of ‘large n’ experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluations. But what can be done when there are insufficient units of assignment to apply statistical tests to determine the difference in outcomes between the treatment and comparison group? The need for such ‘small n’ approaches can arise when investigating one or a few cases, such as capacity building in a single organisation or a policy introduced at the national level, or possibly when an intervention has significant heterogeneity, with different recipients receiving different forms of support. This presentation will discuss some of the methodologies proposed for tackling causal inference in small n cases, including Realist Evaluation, Contribution Analysis, Outcome Mapping and Most Significant Change. Dr. White examines the possibility of drawing out common elements from these different methodologies and developing an integrated framework for small n analysis.
Date: February 1, 2012
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room
ISID Complex, Plot No. 4
Vasant Kunj Institutional Area
New Delhi- 110 070(INDIA)
Location:
View ISID Complex in a larger map
Monday, January 23, 2012
2 February 2012: Institutions, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows
Rahul Mukherjee
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Abstract:
Countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets
and exhibit concentrated corporate ownership. An equilibrium business
cycle model of international capital flows with corporate governance
frictions between outside and insider investors explains both
phenomena. Investment dynamics under insider control leads relative
dividend and labor income for outsiders to be more negatively
correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Consequently,
outsiders hold more domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. I
provide empirical evidence on this hedging demand. Concentrated
ownership arises because international diversification through the
sale of domestic assets by insiders is penalized by lower stock market
valuation.
Date: February 2, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Abstract:
Countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets
and exhibit concentrated corporate ownership. An equilibrium business
cycle model of international capital flows with corporate governance
frictions between outside and insider investors explains both
phenomena. Investment dynamics under insider control leads relative
dividend and labor income for outsiders to be more negatively
correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Consequently,
outsiders hold more domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. I
provide empirical evidence on this hedging demand. Concentrated
ownership arises because international diversification through the
sale of domestic assets by insiders is penalized by lower stock market
valuation.
Date: February 2, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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27 January 2012: Commodity Bundling in Government Securities Auctions
Samita Sareen
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond
auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper
argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely
prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer
imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and
compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data
set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to
show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the
issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond
auctions.
Date: January 27, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond
auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper
argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely
prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer
imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and
compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data
set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to
show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the
issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond
auctions.
Date: January 27, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
19 January 2012: Commodity Bundling in Government Securities Auctions: An Analysis of the Primary Dealer Model in Canada
Samita Sareen
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond auctions.
Date: January 19, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Berkeley Research Group, New York
Abstract:
Does the decision of primary dealers to support government bond auctions depend critically on compensation from the issuer? This paper argues that the answer is yes. Primary dealer system is a widely prevalent method for issuing government securities in which the issuer imposes participation obligations on human intermediaries and compensates them with rents conditional on compliance. A unique data set from the Government of Canada securities auctions is utilized to show that dealers respond strongly to the compensations offered by the issuer when deciding to bid as primary dealers in government bond auctions.
Date: January 19, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, January 16, 2012
20 January 2012: Monetary Policy Switching to Avoid a Liquidity Trap
Siddhartha Chattopadhyay
IIT Kharagpur
Abstract:
We propose a monetary-policy-switching Taylor Rule, which would allow the economy to avoid a liquidity trap. In the event of a demand shock, large enough to send the nominal interest rate below zero under a Taylor Rule with a fixed long-run inflation target, the monetary authority switches to a higher short-run inflation target which decays toward the long-run target over time. If the short-run target is sufficiently persistent, then the increase in inflationary expectations is large enough to raise inflation and output even though the nominal interest rate does not fall below zero. The switching regime imparts an inflation bias to policy, but avoids indeterminacy created by the fixed nominal interest rate in a liquidity trap.
Date: January 20, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
IIT Kharagpur
Abstract:
We propose a monetary-policy-switching Taylor Rule, which would allow the economy to avoid a liquidity trap. In the event of a demand shock, large enough to send the nominal interest rate below zero under a Taylor Rule with a fixed long-run inflation target, the monetary authority switches to a higher short-run inflation target which decays toward the long-run target over time. If the short-run target is sufficiently persistent, then the increase in inflationary expectations is large enough to raise inflation and output even though the nominal interest rate does not fall below zero. The switching regime imparts an inflation bias to policy, but avoids indeterminacy created by the fixed nominal interest rate in a liquidity trap.
Date: January 20, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Thursday, January 12, 2012
13 January 2012: Bailouts and Financial Fragility
Todd Keister
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Abstract:
How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a "bailout" distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may, in addition, leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Abstract:
How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a "bailout" distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may, in addition, leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
12 January 2012: Corruption in India: When Piety is not Enough
Pranab Bardhan
University of California
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
Department of Economics (Lecture Theatre),
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of California
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
Department of Economics (Lecture Theatre),
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, January 6, 2012
12 January 2012: Free Banking in Scotland and Canada: Lessons for Today
Lawrence H White
George Mason University
Abstract:
Today, financial crises, recessions, unemployment, sovereign dept, and social instability are being blamed on free-market capitalism. The financial sector is under special attack. The irony, however, is that banking is one of the most centrally planned and regulated sectors of modern economies.
What is required to create more macroeconomic stability: more central control or less? Most people take it for granted that money and banking must be regulated by national governments and a central bank, but it has not always been so. Lawrence White will discuss the theory and history of laissez-faire banking. He will compare the records of free-banking and central banking and comment on what lessons these records can teach us today.
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Centre for Civil Society,
A-69 Hauz Khas,
New Delhi-110016(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
George Mason University
Abstract:
Today, financial crises, recessions, unemployment, sovereign dept, and social instability are being blamed on free-market capitalism. The financial sector is under special attack. The irony, however, is that banking is one of the most centrally planned and regulated sectors of modern economies.
What is required to create more macroeconomic stability: more central control or less? Most people take it for granted that money and banking must be regulated by national governments and a central bank, but it has not always been so. Lawrence White will discuss the theory and history of laissez-faire banking. He will compare the records of free-banking and central banking and comment on what lessons these records can teach us today.
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Centre for Civil Society,
A-69 Hauz Khas,
New Delhi-110016(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
10 January 2012: Global Economic Prospects and the Eurozone Crisis
Mario Blejer
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
6 January 2012: Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?
Sridhar Moorty
University of Toronto
Abstract:
This paper asks whether brand extension can serve as a signal of product quality given that it costs less than a new brand. (Existing literature has assumed either that brand extension is cost-neutral or that it costs more.) I show that it can as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, but the argument is unconvincing. For one thing, the separating equilibrium is not unique; a pooling equilibrium also exists in which brand extension signals nothing. For another, the separating equilibrium relies on off-equilibrium beliefs that are poorly motivated in the model. I propose a refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that resolves both issues. Empirical off-equilibrium beliefs requires that consumers' off-equilibrium beliefs be justifiable on the basis of their prior beliefs and their product performance observations. With empirical off-equilibrium beliefs, two necessary conditions for brand extension to signal product quality are identified: (i) consumers must perceive old and new products of the firm to be positively correlated in quality, and (ii) at least some consumers must identify with brands, and not the firm behind the brand. Even with these conditions in place, the signaling argument is fragile: firm observability of past performance diminishes brand extension's signaling capability; an arbitrarily small probability of failure for good products eliminates it. My results suggest that going forward the case for brand extension must rest on foundations other than signaling product quality.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Toronto
Abstract:
This paper asks whether brand extension can serve as a signal of product quality given that it costs less than a new brand. (Existing literature has assumed either that brand extension is cost-neutral or that it costs more.) I show that it can as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, but the argument is unconvincing. For one thing, the separating equilibrium is not unique; a pooling equilibrium also exists in which brand extension signals nothing. For another, the separating equilibrium relies on off-equilibrium beliefs that are poorly motivated in the model. I propose a refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that resolves both issues. Empirical off-equilibrium beliefs requires that consumers' off-equilibrium beliefs be justifiable on the basis of their prior beliefs and their product performance observations. With empirical off-equilibrium beliefs, two necessary conditions for brand extension to signal product quality are identified: (i) consumers must perceive old and new products of the firm to be positively correlated in quality, and (ii) at least some consumers must identify with brands, and not the firm behind the brand. Even with these conditions in place, the signaling argument is fragile: firm observability of past performance diminishes brand extension's signaling capability; an arbitrarily small probability of failure for good products eliminates it. My results suggest that going forward the case for brand extension must rest on foundations other than signaling product quality.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
6 January 2012: Long-run Growth Expectations and 'Global Imbalances'
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Abstract:
This paper examines to what extent the build-up of "global imbalances"
since the mid-1990s can be explained in a purely real open-economy
DSGE model in which agents' perceptions of long-run growth are based
on filtering observed changes in productivity. We show that long-run
growth estimates based on filtering U.S. productivity data comove
strongly with long-horizon survey expectations. By simulating the
model in which agents filter data on U.S. productivity growth, we
closely match the U.S. current account evolution. Moreover, with
household preferences that control the wealth effect on labor supply,
we can generate output movements in line with the data.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Goethe University
Abstract:
This paper examines to what extent the build-up of "global imbalances"
since the mid-1990s can be explained in a purely real open-economy
DSGE model in which agents' perceptions of long-run growth are based
on filtering observed changes in productivity. We show that long-run
growth estimates based on filtering U.S. productivity data comove
strongly with long-horizon survey expectations. By simulating the
model in which agents filter data on U.S. productivity growth, we
closely match the U.S. current account evolution. Moreover, with
household preferences that control the wealth effect on labor supply,
we can generate output movements in line with the data.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, January 2, 2012
13 January 2012: Reputation Building in the Presence of Rating Agents
Priyanka Sharma
Texas A&M University
Abstract:
I consider a finitely repeated game in which an informed borrower interacts with a series of uninformed lenders. A third party rating agent collects information about the past repayment history of borrower and periodically observes an additional signal correlated with borrowers hidden characteristics. He processes this information and provides it to the uninformed lender in the form of a rating. It is shown that information beyond past default choices of the borrower discourages reputation building by low types of borrowers and causes more frequent defaults by them. There exists a set of histories for which the additional information ceases to affect the future ratings at all. Further, additional information has welfare reducing impact on the low types of borrowers.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Texas A&M University
Abstract:
I consider a finitely repeated game in which an informed borrower interacts with a series of uninformed lenders. A third party rating agent collects information about the past repayment history of borrower and periodically observes an additional signal correlated with borrowers hidden characteristics. He processes this information and provides it to the uninformed lender in the form of a rating. It is shown that information beyond past default choices of the borrower discourages reputation building by low types of borrowers and causes more frequent defaults by them. There exists a set of histories for which the additional information ceases to affect the future ratings at all. Further, additional information has welfare reducing impact on the low types of borrowers.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
10 January 2012: The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Child Mortality and Sex Ratios: Evidence from Rural India
S. Anukriti
Columbia University
Abstract:
Recent literature on India's trade liberalization finds that poverty declined at a relatively slower rate in rural districts that were more exposed to tariff reform. Moreover, schooling decreased relatively in districts with employment concentrated in industries losing tariff protection. In this study, we examine whether this trade liberalization episode also influenced infant mortality and sex ratios at birth. Using district-level measures of tariff protection combined with retrospective birth histories, we find that rural districts experiencing relatively larger declines in tariff protection witnessed relatively slower declines in infant mortality as well as relatively slower increases in the sex ratio at birth.
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Columbia University
Abstract:
Recent literature on India's trade liberalization finds that poverty declined at a relatively slower rate in rural districts that were more exposed to tariff reform. Moreover, schooling decreased relatively in districts with employment concentrated in industries losing tariff protection. In this study, we examine whether this trade liberalization episode also influenced infant mortality and sex ratios at birth. Using district-level measures of tariff protection combined with retrospective birth histories, we find that rural districts experiencing relatively larger declines in tariff protection witnessed relatively slower declines in infant mortality as well as relatively slower increases in the sex ratio at birth.
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
3 January 2012: Inflation Targeting and its Current uses in India
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Date: January 3, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Goethe University
Date: January 3, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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