18 January 2013: Incentives and Competition in Micro-finance

Kaniska Dam
Center for Research and Teaching in Economics(CIDE), Mexico City

Abstract:
We analyze a model where micro-finance institutions (MFIs) offer repayment-based incentive contracts to the credit agents whose principal task is to gather information regarding a borrower by exerting costly monitoring efforts. Monitoring by one agent benefits the other, and hence there is externality across contractual relationships. The agents may collude with the borrower by taking bribes, and hide information. We show that, under competition, collusion possibility increases, individual monitoring efforts are lower. Competition may lead to more high-powered incentives relative to a situation where there is a single MFI. We further show that when the monitoring technology is submodular (log-supermodular) in the individual monitoring efforts, optimal monitoring efforts and incentives are strategic substitutes (complements).

Date: January 18, 2013
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)

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15 January 2013: Europe and India between America and China

Timothy Garton Ash
University of Oxford

Abstract:
It is increasingly clear that the geopolitics of our time will be shaped by the emerging superpower rivalry between China and the United States. What role in this new world (dis)order should be played by the European Union, the world's largest confederation of prosperous Western democracies, andby India, the world's largest democracy? Oxford's Professor of European Studies, who is also a leading commentator on international affairs, will speak about Europe's current travails and likely role in the world – and ask a few questions about the part that might be played by India.

Date: January 15, 2013
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Conference Hall-II
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)

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14 January 2013: Stochastic Convergence of Real Wages in Indian Manufacturing- Time Series Evidence with two structural breaks

Homagni Choudhury
Aberystwyth University

Abstract:
The study examines time series data on real wages per worker for production workers for 51 industries from the organized manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973-2003 to determine if inter-industry wages are stochastically converging.  The study uses  a minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test developed by Lee & Strazicich (2003, 2004) that endogenously determines two/one structural breaks in intercept and slope. The findings provide evidence to support that real wages per worker are stochastically converging between industries in India. Given the heterogeneous characteristics of industries, “stochastic convergence” implies real wages between industries converge to an industry-specific “compensating differential” i.e. “stochastic convergence” is consistent with “conditional convergence”. The one/two breaks in relative real wages identified for each industry coincide with India’s two distinct phases of reforms- 1980s weak reforms and 1990s strong reforms. To our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to use a “stochastic convergence” framework to address inter-industry wage structure. Our findings provide new evidence from India and show that efficiency wages due to rent-sharing is potentially an important explanation for inter-industry wage differences in India, whose role seems to have declined over the reforms period.

Date: January 14, 2013
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
ICRIER Conference Room,
Core 6A, 4th Floor,
India Habitat Centre, Lodi Road,
New Delhi – 110 003(INDIA)

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14 January 2013: Public and Social Innovation: New Approaches to Old Problems

Peter Shergold
University of Western Sydney, Australia

Date: January 14, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Conference Hall-II
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)

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4 January 2013: CD DESHMUKH MEMORIAL LECTURE - Grassroots Welfare Schemes and Macroeconomic Choices: India’s Dilemmas

Kaushik Basu
World Bank

Abstract:
This lecture series has been instituted by NCAER in memory of one of India’s most eminent economists and a founding father of NCAER.  Sir Chintaman Dwarakanath Deshmukh was the first Indian to be appointed Governor of the Reserve Bank of India in 1943 and was part of the official Indian delegation to the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. He subsequently served as the Union Finance Minister from 1950 to 1956 under Nehru and was a leading member of NCAER’s first Governing Body. He was honoured by the President of India with the Padma Vibhushan in 1975.

Date: January 4, 2013
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Gulmohar Hall,
India Habitat Centre,
Lodhi Road,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)

RSVP
Ms Sudesh Bala on +91-11-2337-9861 to 63 or on sbala@ncaer.org
Registration required

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14 December 2012: Reducing Choice Overload without Reducing Choices

Sudipto Sarangi
Louisiana State University

Abstract:
Previous studies have demonstrated that a multitude of options can lead to choice overload, reducing decision quality. Through controlled experiments, we examine sequential choice architectures that enable the choice set to remain large while potentially reducing the effect of choice overload. A specific tournament-style architecture achieves this goal. An alternate architecture in which subjects compare each subset of options to the most preferred option encountered thus far fails to improve performance due to the status quo bias. Subject preferences over different choice architectures are negatively correlated with performance, suggesting that providing choice over architectures might reduce the quality of decisions.

Date: December 14, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)

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7 December 2012: Does female leadership impact on governance and corruption? Evidence from a public poverty alleviation program in Andhra Pradesh, India

Farzana Afridi
Indian Statistical Institute

Abstract:
We exploit the* *nation-wide* *policy of randomly allocating village
council headships to women to identify the impact of female political
leadership on the governance of projects implemented under the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in Andhra Pradesh,
India. Using unique data from a primary survey and from a panel of
audit reports on the implementation of projects under the scheme, we
find that the likelihood of inefficiencies and leakages are higher in
village councils reserved for women. These results are explained by
political and administrative inexperience making female headed
councils more vulnerable to bureaucratic capture of power. Our
findings highlight the importance of capacity building and
institutional support to improve the effectiveness of affirmative
action policies and bolster women’s political participation in
developing countries.

Date: December 7, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)

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