Lawrence H White
George Mason University
Abstract:
Today, financial crises, recessions, unemployment, sovereign dept, and social instability are being blamed on free-market capitalism. The financial sector is under special attack. The irony, however, is that banking is one of the most centrally planned and regulated sectors of modern economies.
What is required to create more macroeconomic stability: more central control or less? Most people take it for granted that money and banking must be regulated by national governments and a central bank, but it has not always been so. Lawrence White will discuss the theory and history of laissez-faire banking. He will compare the records of free-banking and central banking and comment on what lessons these records can teach us today.
Date: January 12, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Centre for Civil Society,
A-69 Hauz Khas,
New Delhi-110016(INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, January 6, 2012
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
10 January 2012: Global Economic Prospects and the Eurozone Crisis
Mario Blejer
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Upper Basement Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
6 January 2012: Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?
Sridhar Moorty
University of Toronto
Abstract:
This paper asks whether brand extension can serve as a signal of product quality given that it costs less than a new brand. (Existing literature has assumed either that brand extension is cost-neutral or that it costs more.) I show that it can as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, but the argument is unconvincing. For one thing, the separating equilibrium is not unique; a pooling equilibrium also exists in which brand extension signals nothing. For another, the separating equilibrium relies on off-equilibrium beliefs that are poorly motivated in the model. I propose a refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that resolves both issues. Empirical off-equilibrium beliefs requires that consumers' off-equilibrium beliefs be justifiable on the basis of their prior beliefs and their product performance observations. With empirical off-equilibrium beliefs, two necessary conditions for brand extension to signal product quality are identified: (i) consumers must perceive old and new products of the firm to be positively correlated in quality, and (ii) at least some consumers must identify with brands, and not the firm behind the brand. Even with these conditions in place, the signaling argument is fragile: firm observability of past performance diminishes brand extension's signaling capability; an arbitrarily small probability of failure for good products eliminates it. My results suggest that going forward the case for brand extension must rest on foundations other than signaling product quality.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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University of Toronto
Abstract:
This paper asks whether brand extension can serve as a signal of product quality given that it costs less than a new brand. (Existing literature has assumed either that brand extension is cost-neutral or that it costs more.) I show that it can as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, but the argument is unconvincing. For one thing, the separating equilibrium is not unique; a pooling equilibrium also exists in which brand extension signals nothing. For another, the separating equilibrium relies on off-equilibrium beliefs that are poorly motivated in the model. I propose a refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that resolves both issues. Empirical off-equilibrium beliefs requires that consumers' off-equilibrium beliefs be justifiable on the basis of their prior beliefs and their product performance observations. With empirical off-equilibrium beliefs, two necessary conditions for brand extension to signal product quality are identified: (i) consumers must perceive old and new products of the firm to be positively correlated in quality, and (ii) at least some consumers must identify with brands, and not the firm behind the brand. Even with these conditions in place, the signaling argument is fragile: firm observability of past performance diminishes brand extension's signaling capability; an arbitrarily small probability of failure for good products eliminates it. My results suggest that going forward the case for brand extension must rest on foundations other than signaling product quality.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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6 January 2012: Long-run Growth Expectations and 'Global Imbalances'
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Abstract:
This paper examines to what extent the build-up of "global imbalances"
since the mid-1990s can be explained in a purely real open-economy
DSGE model in which agents' perceptions of long-run growth are based
on filtering observed changes in productivity. We show that long-run
growth estimates based on filtering U.S. productivity data comove
strongly with long-horizon survey expectations. By simulating the
model in which agents filter data on U.S. productivity growth, we
closely match the U.S. current account evolution. Moreover, with
household preferences that control the wealth effect on labor supply,
we can generate output movements in line with the data.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Goethe University
Abstract:
This paper examines to what extent the build-up of "global imbalances"
since the mid-1990s can be explained in a purely real open-economy
DSGE model in which agents' perceptions of long-run growth are based
on filtering observed changes in productivity. We show that long-run
growth estimates based on filtering U.S. productivity data comove
strongly with long-horizon survey expectations. By simulating the
model in which agents filter data on U.S. productivity growth, we
closely match the U.S. current account evolution. Moreover, with
household preferences that control the wealth effect on labor supply,
we can generate output movements in line with the data.
Date: January 6, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Monday, January 2, 2012
13 January 2012: Reputation Building in the Presence of Rating Agents
Priyanka Sharma
Texas A&M University
Abstract:
I consider a finitely repeated game in which an informed borrower interacts with a series of uninformed lenders. A third party rating agent collects information about the past repayment history of borrower and periodically observes an additional signal correlated with borrowers hidden characteristics. He processes this information and provides it to the uninformed lender in the form of a rating. It is shown that information beyond past default choices of the borrower discourages reputation building by low types of borrowers and causes more frequent defaults by them. There exists a set of histories for which the additional information ceases to affect the future ratings at all. Further, additional information has welfare reducing impact on the low types of borrowers.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Texas A&M University
Abstract:
I consider a finitely repeated game in which an informed borrower interacts with a series of uninformed lenders. A third party rating agent collects information about the past repayment history of borrower and periodically observes an additional signal correlated with borrowers hidden characteristics. He processes this information and provides it to the uninformed lender in the form of a rating. It is shown that information beyond past default choices of the borrower discourages reputation building by low types of borrowers and causes more frequent defaults by them. There exists a set of histories for which the additional information ceases to affect the future ratings at all. Further, additional information has welfare reducing impact on the low types of borrowers.
Date: January 13, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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10 January 2012: The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Child Mortality and Sex Ratios: Evidence from Rural India
S. Anukriti
Columbia University
Abstract:
Recent literature on India's trade liberalization finds that poverty declined at a relatively slower rate in rural districts that were more exposed to tariff reform. Moreover, schooling decreased relatively in districts with employment concentrated in industries losing tariff protection. In this study, we examine whether this trade liberalization episode also influenced infant mortality and sex ratios at birth. Using district-level measures of tariff protection combined with retrospective birth histories, we find that rural districts experiencing relatively larger declines in tariff protection witnessed relatively slower declines in infant mortality as well as relatively slower increases in the sex ratio at birth.
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Columbia University
Abstract:
Recent literature on India's trade liberalization finds that poverty declined at a relatively slower rate in rural districts that were more exposed to tariff reform. Moreover, schooling decreased relatively in districts with employment concentrated in industries losing tariff protection. In this study, we examine whether this trade liberalization episode also influenced infant mortality and sex ratios at birth. Using district-level measures of tariff protection combined with retrospective birth histories, we find that rural districts experiencing relatively larger declines in tariff protection witnessed relatively slower declines in infant mortality as well as relatively slower increases in the sex ratio at birth.
Date: January 10, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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3 January 2012: Inflation Targeting and its Current uses in India
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Date: January 3, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Goethe University
Date: January 3, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Room No. 304
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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