Surendrakumar Bagde
Ministry of Finance
Abstract:
Public policy in modern Indian features affirmative action-policies intended to reduce persistent inequality stemming from a centuries-old caste structure. We study the effects of one such affirmative action program. Specifically, we examine the consequences of an admissions policy to engineering colleges that fixes percentage quotas, common across 214 colleges, for each of six disadvantaged castes. We have obtained access to exceptionally rich data for study of this affirmative action programdata that include the test scores that were used to administer admissions decision rules, as well as detailed independent ability metrics. Our analysis indicates that for targeted students the program has significant and substantial positive effects both on college attendance and first-year academic achievement.
Date: November 18, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Monday, November 14, 2011
16 November 2011: General Equilibrium, Wariness and Bubbles
Aloisio Araujo
IMPA Brazil
Abstract:
We say that a consumer is wary if she overlooks gains but not losses
in remote sets of dates or states. We formulate this by requiring
preferences to be upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous and
Bewley's result on existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium whose prices
are not necessarily countably additive holds. We relate wariness to
some concepts studied in decision theory like lack of myopia and
ambiguity aversion. Wary infinite lived agents are not impatient, have
optimality conditions, in the form of weaker transversality
conditions, that allow them to be creditors at infinity and bubbles
occur for positive net supply assets completing the markets. In a two
date economy, with infinite states, wary agents are not myopic and
bubbles occur, as asset prices do not have to equal the series of
returns weighted by state prices. A large class of efficient
allocations can only be implemented with asset bubbles. Pessimistic
attitudes lead agents to overvalue assets or durable goods with
hedging properties, like gold.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
IMPA Brazil
Abstract:
We say that a consumer is wary if she overlooks gains but not losses
in remote sets of dates or states. We formulate this by requiring
preferences to be upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous and
Bewley's result on existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium whose prices
are not necessarily countably additive holds. We relate wariness to
some concepts studied in decision theory like lack of myopia and
ambiguity aversion. Wary infinite lived agents are not impatient, have
optimality conditions, in the form of weaker transversality
conditions, that allow them to be creditors at infinity and bubbles
occur for positive net supply assets completing the markets. In a two
date economy, with infinite states, wary agents are not myopic and
bubbles occur, as asset prices do not have to equal the series of
returns weighted by state prices. A large class of efficient
allocations can only be implemented with asset bubbles. Pessimistic
attitudes lead agents to overvalue assets or durable goods with
hedging properties, like gold.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
16 November 2011: The World Under Pressure: How China and India are Influencing the Global Economy and Environment
Carl Dahlman
Georgetown University
Abstract:
The rapid rise of China and India is reshaping our global economic and environmental systems--raising major issues of stability, governance, and sustainability. This book develops a framework that shows the interdependence between economic size, trade, finance, technology, environment, security, and global governance. This framework provides data on the speed of global power shifts, traces the implications for nations worldwide and offers insights into our most pressing concerns.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Georgetown University
Abstract:
The rapid rise of China and India is reshaping our global economic and environmental systems--raising major issues of stability, governance, and sustainability. This book develops a framework that shows the interdependence between economic size, trade, finance, technology, environment, security, and global governance. This framework provides data on the speed of global power shifts, traces the implications for nations worldwide and offers insights into our most pressing concerns.
Date: November 16, 2011
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room, 2nd Floor
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at jsriram@worldbank.org
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
11 November 2011: Remember when it Rained: The Illusiveness of Gender
Laura Zimmermann
University of Michigan
Abstract:
Indian girls have significantly lower school enrollment rates than
boys. Anecdotal evidence suggests that gender-differential treatment
is the main explanation, but empirical support is often weak and
seemingly inconsistent. I propose that this may be due to age-specific
forms of discrimination. I analyze school enrollment using rainfall
shocks, a plausibly exogenous source of income variation. Girls's
school enrollment is more vulnerable to rainfall shocks than that of
boys, with 6-10 year olds driving these effects. This is consistent
with young girls being out of school because boys's education is
prioritized, whereas older girls suffer from low perceived benefits of
education.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Michigan
Abstract:
Indian girls have significantly lower school enrollment rates than
boys. Anecdotal evidence suggests that gender-differential treatment
is the main explanation, but empirical support is often weak and
seemingly inconsistent. I propose that this may be due to age-specific
forms of discrimination. I analyze school enrollment using rainfall
shocks, a plausibly exogenous source of income variation. Girls's
school enrollment is more vulnerable to rainfall shocks than that of
boys, with 6-10 year olds driving these effects. This is consistent
with young girls being out of school because boys's education is
prioritized, whereas older girls suffer from low perceived benefits of
education.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
11 November 2011: The Dark Side of the Vote: Misleading Signals, Social Information, and Information Aggregation through Majority Voting
Rebecca Morton
New York University
Abstract:
We present experiments on information aggregation through majority voting in which subjects can receive misleading signals. We argue that when signals are possibly misleading, majority voting can result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We also investigate the interaction between different types of social information and the bias due to misleading signals. We find that voting fails to correct for misleading signals and that group decisions can be biased as a consequence. However, we do not find a significant difference between individual and group decision-making in these cases. Yet, social information on prior choices makes group decision-making worse when signals are misleading. Theoretically, social information on consequences should alleviate the bias due to misleading signals; however, we find that in our experiments subjects appear to ignore such information and it fails to reduce the bias.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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New York University
Abstract:
We present experiments on information aggregation through majority voting in which subjects can receive misleading signals. We argue that when signals are possibly misleading, majority voting can result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We also investigate the interaction between different types of social information and the bias due to misleading signals. We find that voting fails to correct for misleading signals and that group decisions can be biased as a consequence. However, we do not find a significant difference between individual and group decision-making in these cases. Yet, social information on prior choices makes group decision-making worse when signals are misleading. Theoretically, social information on consequences should alleviate the bias due to misleading signals; however, we find that in our experiments subjects appear to ignore such information and it fails to reduce the bias.
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, November 4, 2011
11 November 2011: Japan: In Decline or Recovery?
Sheila A. Smith
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
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Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Date: November 11, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
8 November 2011: It's a boy! Women and Non-Monetary Benefits from a Son in India
Laura Zimmermann
University of Michigan
Abstract:
It is well-documented that in a number of countries unnaturally few
girls are born relative to boys. Explanations have focused on a range
of potential reasons, including economic and cultural benefits from
having a son. Households are usually treated as monolithic entities,
however, and the motivations of particular household members are
understudied. In contrast, this paper looks at a potential benefit
mothers derive from giving birth to a boy - an improvement in their
position within the household. I analyze this hypothesis using
households with young first-borns from a nationally representative
Indian dataset. The results suggest that women do indeed gain in
non-monetary terms: Having a boy rather than a girl leads to increased
joint household decision-making powers and to more freedom in carrying
out activities without the explicit consent of other household
members. This implies that even young women may have a self-interest
in practicing son preference.
Date: November 8, 2011
Time: 02:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Michigan
Abstract:
It is well-documented that in a number of countries unnaturally few
girls are born relative to boys. Explanations have focused on a range
of potential reasons, including economic and cultural benefits from
having a son. Households are usually treated as monolithic entities,
however, and the motivations of particular household members are
understudied. In contrast, this paper looks at a potential benefit
mothers derive from giving birth to a boy - an improvement in their
position within the household. I analyze this hypothesis using
households with young first-borns from a nationally representative
Indian dataset. The results suggest that women do indeed gain in
non-monetary terms: Having a boy rather than a girl leads to increased
joint household decision-making powers and to more freedom in carrying
out activities without the explicit consent of other household
members. This implies that even young women may have a self-interest
in practicing son preference.
Date: November 8, 2011
Time: 02:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
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