Diane Coffey
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists have long thought of dual economies, one rural, agricultural and one urban, non-agricultural. Development then entails the permanent movement of households out of agriculture into non-agriculture. More recently, there is considerable evidence suggesting that labour migration from South Asian villages is not only common but also temporary and for short periods of time.
The paper discusses results from new survey data that helps illuminate how Indian rural, agricultural households take advantage of urban, non-agricultural employment opportunities through short-term migration. The sample comprises 700 households based in 70 villages in rural Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh. The data also includes in-depth interviews with 2,224 adults in these households to learn about their migration histories. The data suggest that short-term migration is an important and repeated income-generating strategy in this population, is almost universal among young men, and is extremely common among young women. Migration is costly in the deprivation experienced while working away from home, but seems to carry little risk of not finding work in urban spot labour markets, which pays high wages compared to less common labour work near the village. Besides detailing the migration experience of the surveyed adults, the work stresses the changes in the nature of migration since the 1990s. The dataset is also unique in exploring the experiences of children who migrate, and of those left behind while their parents migrate.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Monday, September 19, 2011
Thursday, September 15, 2011
22 September 2011: Performance of the PDS: Evidence from Secondary Data and the Field
Reetika Khera
Indian Institute of Technology
Abstract:
Looking beyond national averages at state level indicators, one finds that the PDS is witnessing a revival in several states. Based on secondary data from the NSS, it looks at rates of "diversion" of grain from the PDS over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 period. Given the large variations in state-level performance on key parameters such as entitlements, diversion rates, quality of grain, accessibility and so on, one finds that it is misleading to talk about the PDS in terms of national averages. The results of a nine-state field study of the PDS undertaken in June 2011 further substantiate the revival of the PDS in several states. Some explanations for why the PDS functions in some states and is languishing in others are offered. I will also report on respondents views on cash transfers as an alternative to the PDS, and why they preferred one or the other.
Date: September 22, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Indian Institute of Technology
Abstract:
Looking beyond national averages at state level indicators, one finds that the PDS is witnessing a revival in several states. Based on secondary data from the NSS, it looks at rates of "diversion" of grain from the PDS over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 period. Given the large variations in state-level performance on key parameters such as entitlements, diversion rates, quality of grain, accessibility and so on, one finds that it is misleading to talk about the PDS in terms of national averages. The results of a nine-state field study of the PDS undertaken in June 2011 further substantiate the revival of the PDS in several states. Some explanations for why the PDS functions in some states and is languishing in others are offered. I will also report on respondents views on cash transfers as an alternative to the PDS, and why they preferred one or the other.
Date: September 22, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, September 13, 2011
16 September 2011: Professional Advice from Randomly Transparent Committees
Saptarshi P. Ghosh
University of Birmingham
Abstract:
This paper studies voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret committee where voting profiles get `leaked' to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on truthful (or informative) voting and the social welfare from committee decisions. We show that for informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient to have both random transparency and the unanimity voting rule provided that the common prior is not too informative and the transparency probability is intermediate. We then show that no committee that maximises social welfare can enforce informative voting, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable. We then show that with a low prior (the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any unanimous committee.
Date: September 16, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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University of Birmingham
Abstract:
This paper studies voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret committee where voting profiles get `leaked' to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on truthful (or informative) voting and the social welfare from committee decisions. We show that for informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient to have both random transparency and the unanimity voting rule provided that the common prior is not too informative and the transparency probability is intermediate. We then show that no committee that maximises social welfare can enforce informative voting, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable. We then show that with a low prior (the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any unanimous committee.
Date: September 16, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, September 9, 2011
15 September 2011: Have Patience, Its Good
Amit Goyal
Indian Statistical Institute
Abstract:
In this paper we model a consumer who is ex ante unaware of his preferences over the set of alternatives and who can learn his preference by trying those alternatives one by one. He has a discount factor which prevents him from experimenting forever. Higher the patience level of the consumer, bigger will be the experimentation period and the more he will learn about his preferences. We then introduce firms in the model which will provide these alternatives with the aim to maximize profits. This paper is an attempt to answer how is this number of alternatives provided related with the average patience level of the agents in the economy.
Date: September 15, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Indian Statistical Institute
Abstract:
In this paper we model a consumer who is ex ante unaware of his preferences over the set of alternatives and who can learn his preference by trying those alternatives one by one. He has a discount factor which prevents him from experimenting forever. Higher the patience level of the consumer, bigger will be the experimentation period and the more he will learn about his preferences. We then introduce firms in the model which will provide these alternatives with the aim to maximize profits. This paper is an attempt to answer how is this number of alternatives provided related with the average patience level of the agents in the economy.
Date: September 15, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, August 30, 2011
3 September 2011: Tastes, Castes, and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferences
Karla Hoff
The World Bank
Abstract:
Economists have traditionally treated preferences as exogenously given. Preferences are assumed to be influenced by neither beliefs nor the constraints people face. As a consequence, changes in behaviour are explained exclusively in terms of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Here we argue that the opposition to explaining behavioural changes in terms of preference changes is ill-founded, that the psychological properties of preferences render them susceptible to direct social influences, and that the impact of "society" on preferences is likely to have important economic and social consequences.
Date: September 3, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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The World Bank
Abstract:
Economists have traditionally treated preferences as exogenously given. Preferences are assumed to be influenced by neither beliefs nor the constraints people face. As a consequence, changes in behaviour are explained exclusively in terms of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Here we argue that the opposition to explaining behavioural changes in terms of preference changes is ill-founded, that the psychological properties of preferences render them susceptible to direct social influences, and that the impact of "society" on preferences is likely to have important economic and social consequences.
Date: September 3, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Wednesday, August 24, 2011
26 August 2011: Millennium Development Goals: How is India Doing?
Sudipto Mundle
NIPFP
Date: August 26, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor)
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
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NIPFP
Date: August 26, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor)
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, August 23, 2011
29 August 2011: Middle Class Dreams: India’s One-Child Families
Alaka Basu
Cornell University and
Sonalde Desai
University of Maryland
Abstract:
While rapid fertility decline in India during the last two decades has received considerable attention, much of the discourse has focused on the decline in high parity births. However, this presentation finds that almost hidden from the public gaze, a small segment of the Indian population has begun the transition to extremely low fertility. Among the urban middle classes, it is no longer unusual to find families stopping after one child, even when this child is a girl. Using data from the India Human Development Survey of 2004–2005, the presentation examines the factors that may lead some families to stop at a single child. Better understanding of the correlates of this small but distinct segment of society also provides a window into the role of demography in shaping the future of social inequality in a society undergoing rapid transition.
Date: August 29, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Committee Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Cornell University and
Sonalde Desai
University of Maryland
Abstract:
While rapid fertility decline in India during the last two decades has received considerable attention, much of the discourse has focused on the decline in high parity births. However, this presentation finds that almost hidden from the public gaze, a small segment of the Indian population has begun the transition to extremely low fertility. Among the urban middle classes, it is no longer unusual to find families stopping after one child, even when this child is a girl. Using data from the India Human Development Survey of 2004–2005, the presentation examines the factors that may lead some families to stop at a single child. Better understanding of the correlates of this small but distinct segment of society also provides a window into the role of demography in shaping the future of social inequality in a society undergoing rapid transition.
Date: August 29, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Committee Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
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