Sourabh Bikas Paul
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Abstract:
Amongst the various inequities typically associated with the caste system in India, probably one of the most debilitating is the perception that one is doomed by birth, i.e., social and economic mobility across generations is difficult. We study the extent and evolution of this lack of mobility by contrasting the intergenerational mobility rates of the historically disadvantaged scheduled castes and tribes (SC/ST) in India with the rest of the workforce in terms of their education attainment, occupation choices and wages. Using household survey data from successive rounds of the National Sample Survey between 1983 and 2005, we find that inter-generational education and income mobility rates of SC/STs have converged to non-SC/ST levels during this period. Moreover, SC/STs have been switching occupations relative to their parents at increasing rates, matching the corresponding switch rates of non-SC/STs in the process. Interestingly, we have found that a common feature for both SC/STs and non-SC/STs is that the sharpest change in intergenerational income mobility has been for middle income households. This is consistent with the effects of easing credit constraints, a phenomenon that did characterize this period. We conclude that the last twenty years of major structural changes in India have also coincided with a breaking down of caste-based historical barriers to socio-economic mobility.
Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Monday, April 23, 2012
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
19 April 2012: Spillovers, Absorptive Capacity and Agglomeration
Sergey Lychagin
Central European University
Abstract:
I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where rms are mobile and heterogeneous in their ability to adopt outside knowledge (absorptive capacity). I develop a static model of industry agglomeration where, in equilibrium, the force of attraction induced by spillovers is counteracted by the force of repulsion created by local competition. The model is applied to a sample of the US software firms. I estimate the structural parameters of the model and obtain the following results: (a) The data are consistent with highly localized knowledge spillovers; (b) The attraction force induced by spillovers creates a signifi cant sorting pattern placing rms with higher absorptive capacity in more agglomerated counties; (c) Ignoring rm heterogeneity in absorptive capacity leads to substantially biased estimates of gains from spillovers in policy experiments.
Date: April 19, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Central European University
Abstract:
I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where rms are mobile and heterogeneous in their ability to adopt outside knowledge (absorptive capacity). I develop a static model of industry agglomeration where, in equilibrium, the force of attraction induced by spillovers is counteracted by the force of repulsion created by local competition. The model is applied to a sample of the US software firms. I estimate the structural parameters of the model and obtain the following results: (a) The data are consistent with highly localized knowledge spillovers; (b) The attraction force induced by spillovers creates a signifi cant sorting pattern placing rms with higher absorptive capacity in more agglomerated counties; (c) Ignoring rm heterogeneity in absorptive capacity leads to substantially biased estimates of gains from spillovers in policy experiments.
Date: April 19, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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20 April 2012: Religion, Political Identity and Public Goods in India
Sonia Bhalotra
University of Bristol
Abstract:
(1) Politician Identity and Religious Conflict in India This paper investigates the impact of Muslim political representation on religious conflict in India during 1980-2007. We code religion from name and construct updated conflict data from Times of India archives. The analysis is currently conducted at the district level. We instrument the share of Muslims elected to state assemblies from the index district with the share of Muslims who won against non-Muslims in close elections in that district. Preliminary results suggest that raising the share of Muslim politicians in state assemblies results in a sizeable decline in the incidence of Hindu- Muslim riots, consistent with evidence that Muslims are more often the victims of such incidents. A significant but small part of the total effect appears to arise from positive selection of minority leaders. Our results are consistent with parochial politics and with theories that indicate the relevance of political identity for policy outcomes (Besley and Coate, 1997). They also suggests a cause of conflict, and hence a solution for the control of conflict, that has not been previously considered in the conflict literature.
(2) Religion, Political Identity and Public Health Delivery This paper analyzes whether the religious identity of political leaders in India influences policy-determined variation in health outcomes, both for citizens of their religious group and for the population as a whole. In order to analyze the causal effect of the religious identity of politicians, we take advantage of the fact that some Muslim politicians contested in close elections against non-Muslim politicians. Results show that the presence of Muslim politicians significantly reduces infant and neonatal mortality, consistent with positive selection of Muslim candidates in constituencies in which Muslims have a population minority (Banerjee and Pande 2007). We do not find evidence of religious favoritism: Muslims and non-Muslims benefit equally from the presence of Muslim politicians.
Date: April 20, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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University of Bristol
Abstract:
(1) Politician Identity and Religious Conflict in India This paper investigates the impact of Muslim political representation on religious conflict in India during 1980-2007. We code religion from name and construct updated conflict data from Times of India archives. The analysis is currently conducted at the district level. We instrument the share of Muslims elected to state assemblies from the index district with the share of Muslims who won against non-Muslims in close elections in that district. Preliminary results suggest that raising the share of Muslim politicians in state assemblies results in a sizeable decline in the incidence of Hindu- Muslim riots, consistent with evidence that Muslims are more often the victims of such incidents. A significant but small part of the total effect appears to arise from positive selection of minority leaders. Our results are consistent with parochial politics and with theories that indicate the relevance of political identity for policy outcomes (Besley and Coate, 1997). They also suggests a cause of conflict, and hence a solution for the control of conflict, that has not been previously considered in the conflict literature.
(2) Religion, Political Identity and Public Health Delivery This paper analyzes whether the religious identity of political leaders in India influences policy-determined variation in health outcomes, both for citizens of their religious group and for the population as a whole. In order to analyze the causal effect of the religious identity of politicians, we take advantage of the fact that some Muslim politicians contested in close elections against non-Muslim politicians. Results show that the presence of Muslim politicians significantly reduces infant and neonatal mortality, consistent with positive selection of Muslim candidates in constituencies in which Muslims have a population minority (Banerjee and Pande 2007). We do not find evidence of religious favoritism: Muslims and non-Muslims benefit equally from the presence of Muslim politicians.
Date: April 20, 2012
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, April 13, 2012
20 April 2012: Rural Cooperative Banking System in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa: Insights from an Impact Evaluation of the Vaidyanathan Committee Task Force Recommendations
Xavier Gine and Tara Vishwanath
World Bank
Abstract:
In recent years, primary agricultural credit societies
(PACS) have been subject to a massive recapitalization under the
Vaidyanathan Committee Task Force recommendations and the loan waiver
of 2008. As a result, they may end up playing a larger role in the
provision of financial services for the poor. Using survey data
collected in 2007 and 2009 from six districts in Andhra Pradesh and
Orissa, this paper assesses the performance of 140 primary
agricultural credit cooperatives on management practices, personnel,
client performance and growth.
Date: April 20, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Second Floor Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at
jsriram@worldbank.org by thursday, April 19th.
World Bank
Abstract:
In recent years, primary agricultural credit societies
(PACS) have been subject to a massive recapitalization under the
Vaidyanathan Committee Task Force recommendations and the loan waiver
of 2008. As a result, they may end up playing a larger role in the
provision of financial services for the poor. Using survey data
collected in 2007 and 2009 from six districts in Andhra Pradesh and
Orissa, this paper assesses the performance of 140 primary
agricultural credit cooperatives on management practices, personnel,
client performance and growth.
Date: April 20, 2012
Time: 12:30 P.M.
Venue:
Second Floor Conference Room
The World Bank,
70 Lodi Estate,
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Note:
Please confirm your attendance by mail to Jyoti Sriram at
jsriram@worldbank.org by thursday, April 19th.
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
13 April 2012: Migration and Poverty: Evidence from a 30-Year Longitudinal Study Using the ICRISAT Village Level Studies (VLS)
Stefan Dercon
Department for International Development (DFID)
Abstract:
This research is based on newly available survey rounds of the ICRISAT VLS from 2005–06, and a tracking survey of all individuals who used to be in the original sample from the six core ICRISAT VLS in 1975–84 and have now migrated. The resulting 30-year longitudinal dataset has been used to assess how migration has affected the living standards of these individuals, compared to those that stay behind from the same families. Using a comprehensive consumption measure and adjusted for differential cost of living, the study finds considerable increases in the standard of living for most in the sample. The results also indicate a considerable premium for those who have migrated permanently, compared to their relatives who stayed behind. However, no differences are found when focusing on subjective welfare indicators. The study offers a theoretical risk-sharing framework to interpret these findings.
Date: 13 April, 2012
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
For queries, please contact Ms Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2669.
Department for International Development (DFID)
Abstract:
This research is based on newly available survey rounds of the ICRISAT VLS from 2005–06, and a tracking survey of all individuals who used to be in the original sample from the six core ICRISAT VLS in 1975–84 and have now migrated. The resulting 30-year longitudinal dataset has been used to assess how migration has affected the living standards of these individuals, compared to those that stay behind from the same families. Using a comprehensive consumption measure and adjusted for differential cost of living, the study finds considerable increases in the standard of living for most in the sample. The results also indicate a considerable premium for those who have migrated permanently, compared to their relatives who stayed behind. However, no differences are found when focusing on subjective welfare indicators. The study offers a theoretical risk-sharing framework to interpret these findings.
Date: 13 April, 2012
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
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Note:
For queries, please contact Ms Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2669.
Monday, April 9, 2012
12 April 2012: What Do Cartel Ringleaders Do? EC Cartels 1990-2008
Oindrila De
Indian Institute of Management, Indore
Abstract:
The concept of the ringleader within a cartel has specific legal relevance, especially concerning fines and leniency. While the economic theory of cartels rarely attributes any well defined meaning to the term ringleader, it does imply the sorts of roles that the ringleader might assume – facilitating information sharing and coordination, and helping to reconcile the potentially asymmetric incentives of cartel members by accommodating and/or enforcing. This paper uses a sample of 89 EC cartels to establish how far the roles of ringleaders identified by the competition authority can be interpreted as the means by which the cartels attempt to solve the ‘cartel problem(s). It employs two approaches. The first is based on close readings of the European Commission’s decision documents; the second is more indirect, entailing logit analysis which predicts whether there is a ringleader in any particular case in terms of the internal structure of the cartel. The main findings are that: only 1 in 5 cartels involves a ringleader; they only occur in cartels which fix price; and they are most likely in cartels which have more firms, who display larger size asymmetries. The latter result is consistent with collusion theory, in that problems of coordination and the necessity for potential enforcement are likely to be greatest where more firms are involved, especially where they are asymmetric.
One other interesting finding is that there appears to be two broad types of ringleader. In most cases, the ringleader has a potentially aggressive function – leading on price and/or punishing (or threatening to punish) deviation. But in some cases, its functions seem to be restricted to just the facilitating activities of organisation and managing information exchange. On the latter functions, there are sometimes alternative mechanisms used – rather than having a ringleader, the cartel is able to employ a trade association for this purpose.
Date: April 12, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Indian Institute of Management, Indore
Abstract:
The concept of the ringleader within a cartel has specific legal relevance, especially concerning fines and leniency. While the economic theory of cartels rarely attributes any well defined meaning to the term ringleader, it does imply the sorts of roles that the ringleader might assume – facilitating information sharing and coordination, and helping to reconcile the potentially asymmetric incentives of cartel members by accommodating and/or enforcing. This paper uses a sample of 89 EC cartels to establish how far the roles of ringleaders identified by the competition authority can be interpreted as the means by which the cartels attempt to solve the ‘cartel problem(s). It employs two approaches. The first is based on close readings of the European Commission’s decision documents; the second is more indirect, entailing logit analysis which predicts whether there is a ringleader in any particular case in terms of the internal structure of the cartel. The main findings are that: only 1 in 5 cartels involves a ringleader; they only occur in cartels which fix price; and they are most likely in cartels which have more firms, who display larger size asymmetries. The latter result is consistent with collusion theory, in that problems of coordination and the necessity for potential enforcement are likely to be greatest where more firms are involved, especially where they are asymmetric.
One other interesting finding is that there appears to be two broad types of ringleader. In most cases, the ringleader has a potentially aggressive function – leading on price and/or punishing (or threatening to punish) deviation. But in some cases, its functions seem to be restricted to just the facilitating activities of organisation and managing information exchange. On the latter functions, there are sometimes alternative mechanisms used – rather than having a ringleader, the cartel is able to employ a trade association for this purpose.
Date: April 12, 2012
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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