Tarun Ramadorai
University of Oxford
Abstract:
We uncover a new channel through which shocks are transmitted across international markets. Investor flows to funds domiciled in developed markets force significant changes in their portfolio allocations to emerging markets. These forced trades affect equity prices, correlations between emerging markets, and the developed-market betas of emerging markets. These funding-driven fire sale effects are related to, but distinct from those arising purely from high fund holdings or high overlapping ownership of emerging markets in fund portfolios. A simple model and calibration exercise highlight the importance to these findings of 'push' effects from funds' domicile countries, and 'co-ownership spillover' between markets with overlapping fund ownership.
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Monday, September 26, 2011
29 September 2011: Bounded Intertemporal Rationality: Apparent Impatience among South African Pension Recipients
Dean Spears
Princeton University
Abstract:
Behavior that responds most to sooner costs and benefits is often interpreted as evidence of impatient time preference. However, apparent impatience could instead be caused by choice technology that finds optimizing over temporally nearer consequences easier. This paper illustrates this possibility with a simple model and applies its theory of bounded intertemporal rationality to the intra-monthly consumption puzzle. An applied model explains stylized facts that theories of time preference cannot. Novel predictions are verified in a field experiment among pension recipients in Cape Town, South Africa. Monthly consumption cycles are concentrated among participants with low cognitive resources and unpredictable circumstances.
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Princeton University
Abstract:
Behavior that responds most to sooner costs and benefits is often interpreted as evidence of impatient time preference. However, apparent impatience could instead be caused by choice technology that finds optimizing over temporally nearer consequences easier. This paper illustrates this possibility with a simple model and applies its theory of bounded intertemporal rationality to the intra-monthly consumption puzzle. An applied model explains stylized facts that theories of time preference cannot. Novel predictions are verified in a field experiment among pension recipients in Cape Town, South Africa. Monthly consumption cycles are concentrated among participants with low cognitive resources and unpredictable circumstances.
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, September 23, 2011
28 September 2011: Height and cognitive achievement among Indian children
Dean Spears
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists, demographers and medical researchers are accumulating persuasive evidence of lasting consequences of early-life health and net nutrition for life-long economic, cognitive, and health outcomes.
The paper documents and describes an association between child height and cognitive achievement in India using India Human Development Survey (IHDS). Taller children perform better on average on tests of cognitive achievement, in part because of differences in early-life health and net nutrition. Recent research documenting this height – achievement slope has primarily focused on rich countries. Using the India Human Development Survey, a representative sample of 40,000 households which matches anthropometric data to learning tests, this paper documents a height-achievement slope among Indian children. The height-achievement slope in India is more than twice as steep as in the U.S. An earlier survey interviewed some IHDS children’s household eleven years before. Including matched early-life control variables reduces the apparent effect of height, but does not eliminate it; water, sanitation and hygiene maybe particularly important for children’s outcomes. Being one standard deviation taller is associated with being 5 percentage points more likely to be able to write, a slope that falls only to 3.4 percentage points controlling for a long list of contemporary and early-life conditions.
Date: September 28, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
View Larger Map
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists, demographers and medical researchers are accumulating persuasive evidence of lasting consequences of early-life health and net nutrition for life-long economic, cognitive, and health outcomes.
The paper documents and describes an association between child height and cognitive achievement in India using India Human Development Survey (IHDS). Taller children perform better on average on tests of cognitive achievement, in part because of differences in early-life health and net nutrition. Recent research documenting this height – achievement slope has primarily focused on rich countries. Using the India Human Development Survey, a representative sample of 40,000 households which matches anthropometric data to learning tests, this paper documents a height-achievement slope among Indian children. The height-achievement slope in India is more than twice as steep as in the U.S. An earlier survey interviewed some IHDS children’s household eleven years before. Including matched early-life control variables reduces the apparent effect of height, but does not eliminate it; water, sanitation and hygiene maybe particularly important for children’s outcomes. Being one standard deviation taller is associated with being 5 percentage points more likely to be able to write, a slope that falls only to 3.4 percentage points controlling for a long list of contemporary and early-life conditions.
Date: September 28, 2011
Time: 03:30 P.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Note:
For queries, please contact Ms. Sudesh Bala at sbala@ncaer.org or on 011-2345-2664
Location:
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27 September 2011: New Thinking on Building the Corporate Bond Market
Sanjay Banerji
University of Nottingham Business School
Abstract:
Abstract: The paper will review the existing theories of asymmetric information that strongly argues issuance of debt as a superior method of financing that tends to alleviate agency problems. It will also establish the case for a corporate bond market as a means of issuing debt even in the presence of bank loans as providers of debt to firms. Finally, we also argue that the exercise of instituting the corporate bond market will be futile unless it is designed in such a way to minimize information, liquidity and bankruptcy costs.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
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University of Nottingham Business School
Abstract:
Abstract: The paper will review the existing theories of asymmetric information that strongly argues issuance of debt as a superior method of financing that tends to alleviate agency problems. It will also establish the case for a corporate bond market as a means of issuing debt even in the presence of bank loans as providers of debt to firms. Finally, we also argue that the exercise of instituting the corporate bond market will be futile unless it is designed in such a way to minimize information, liquidity and bankruptcy costs.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
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26 September 2011: RSBY – New Frontiers
Anil Swarup
Ministry of Labour and Employment
Date: September 26, 2011
Time: 06:00 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
GIZ office India
21, Jor Bagh
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
Ministry of Labour and Employment
Date: September 26, 2011
Time: 06:00 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Room
GIZ office India
21, Jor Bagh
New Delhi-110003(INDIA)
30 September 2011: Fault Lines in Participatory Democracy
Aruna Roy
Social Activist and Founder, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 05:00 P.M.
Venue:
Auditorium
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
Teen Murthi House
New Delhi-110011(INDIA)
Location:
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Social Activist and Founder, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
Date: September 30, 2011
Time: 05:00 P.M.
Venue:
Auditorium
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
Teen Murthi House
New Delhi-110011(INDIA)
Location:
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Wednesday, September 21, 2011
27 September 2011: Politics and Protesting Publics in Urban India Reflections from the 2006 Sealing Drive and the World of New Delhi’s Traders
Diya Mehra
Centre de Sciences Humaines
Abstract:
In 2006, the Supreme Court ordered that anywhere between 50,000-500,000 shops in Delhi would have to close as they were illegal operating commercial establishments in residential areas. This paper examines the large oppositional campaign put up by Delhi’s traders in protest against the judgment, and what came to be known as the Sealing Drives. The paper uses this example to bring attention to a vast intermediate urban/economic world, betwixt and between the elite and the poor, that has largely been ignored in the existing urban literature on contemporary urban change. It shows how this intermediate world is both enmeshed in the development of a world class city and lifestyles, even as increasingly threatened by the arrival of larger and powerful capital. From the perspective of the traders, the Sealing Drive was a conspiracy between government and new capital; one cemented by high-level corruption and aimed at evicting smaller scale production from the city. In opposition and through their campaign the traders sought to defer the sealing order by deploying nationalist, and anti-colonial repertoires (symbols, discourses, practices) of performative street based politics, spread by harnessing urban memories, affective distress, vernacular understanding of state morality, media coverage, images and cinematic tropes, seeking to interpellate a vast and dispersed oppositional public. What the campaign makes apparent is that the contemporary Indian urban comprises a multitude of urban publics, articulated at the intersection of a number of different dynamics, and in a state of emergent and fluid political formation.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 03:45 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall,
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Centre de Sciences Humaines
Abstract:
In 2006, the Supreme Court ordered that anywhere between 50,000-500,000 shops in Delhi would have to close as they were illegal operating commercial establishments in residential areas. This paper examines the large oppositional campaign put up by Delhi’s traders in protest against the judgment, and what came to be known as the Sealing Drives. The paper uses this example to bring attention to a vast intermediate urban/economic world, betwixt and between the elite and the poor, that has largely been ignored in the existing urban literature on contemporary urban change. It shows how this intermediate world is both enmeshed in the development of a world class city and lifestyles, even as increasingly threatened by the arrival of larger and powerful capital. From the perspective of the traders, the Sealing Drive was a conspiracy between government and new capital; one cemented by high-level corruption and aimed at evicting smaller scale production from the city. In opposition and through their campaign the traders sought to defer the sealing order by deploying nationalist, and anti-colonial repertoires (symbols, discourses, practices) of performative street based politics, spread by harnessing urban memories, affective distress, vernacular understanding of state morality, media coverage, images and cinematic tropes, seeking to interpellate a vast and dispersed oppositional public. What the campaign makes apparent is that the contemporary Indian urban comprises a multitude of urban publics, articulated at the intersection of a number of different dynamics, and in a state of emergent and fluid political formation.
Date: September 27, 2011
Time: 03:45 P.M.
Venue:
Conference Hall,
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
23 September 2011: Election Outcomes and the Poor: Evidence from the Consumption of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India
Sharad Tandon
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Abstract:
Using Indian parliamentary elections in 1998 and 1999, this paper investigates whether election outcomes affect consumption of households belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST's), the poorest Indian households that constitute nearly a quarter of the total population. Using arguably exogenous variation in the party affiliation of successful candidates introduced by close election outcomes, this paper finds that expenditure of households belonging to SC/ST's significantly increased in regions where candidates sympathetic to the groups were successful. These findings demonstrate that election outcomes can significantly impact a large number of the poorest households.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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U.S. Department of Agriculture
Abstract:
Using Indian parliamentary elections in 1998 and 1999, this paper investigates whether election outcomes affect consumption of households belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST's), the poorest Indian households that constitute nearly a quarter of the total population. Using arguably exogenous variation in the party affiliation of successful candidates introduced by close election outcomes, this paper finds that expenditure of households belonging to SC/ST's significantly increased in regions where candidates sympathetic to the groups were successful. These findings demonstrate that election outcomes can significantly impact a large number of the poorest households.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
29 September 2011: Contagion in International Financial Markets
Tarun Ramadorai
University of Oxford
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Oxford
Date: September 29, 2011
Time: 04:00 P.M.
Venue:
NIPFP Auditorium (Ground Floor), Old Building
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Monday, September 19, 2011
23 September 2011: Dual Economies or Dual Livelihoods? Short-Term Migration from Rural India and Non-Agricultural Employment
Diane Coffey
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists have long thought of dual economies, one rural, agricultural and one urban, non-agricultural. Development then entails the permanent movement of households out of agriculture into non-agriculture. More recently, there is considerable evidence suggesting that labour migration from South Asian villages is not only common but also temporary and for short periods of time.
The paper discusses results from new survey data that helps illuminate how Indian rural, agricultural households take advantage of urban, non-agricultural employment opportunities through short-term migration. The sample comprises 700 households based in 70 villages in rural Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh. The data also includes in-depth interviews with 2,224 adults in these households to learn about their migration histories. The data suggest that short-term migration is an important and repeated income-generating strategy in this population, is almost universal among young men, and is extremely common among young women. Migration is costly in the deprivation experienced while working away from home, but seems to carry little risk of not finding work in urban spot labour markets, which pays high wages compared to less common labour work near the village. Besides detailing the migration experience of the surveyed adults, the work stresses the changes in the nature of migration since the 1990s. The dataset is also unique in exploring the experiences of children who migrate, and of those left behind while their parents migrate.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Princeton University
Abstract:
Economists have long thought of dual economies, one rural, agricultural and one urban, non-agricultural. Development then entails the permanent movement of households out of agriculture into non-agriculture. More recently, there is considerable evidence suggesting that labour migration from South Asian villages is not only common but also temporary and for short periods of time.
The paper discusses results from new survey data that helps illuminate how Indian rural, agricultural households take advantage of urban, non-agricultural employment opportunities through short-term migration. The sample comprises 700 households based in 70 villages in rural Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh. The data also includes in-depth interviews with 2,224 adults in these households to learn about their migration histories. The data suggest that short-term migration is an important and repeated income-generating strategy in this population, is almost universal among young men, and is extremely common among young women. Migration is costly in the deprivation experienced while working away from home, but seems to carry little risk of not finding work in urban spot labour markets, which pays high wages compared to less common labour work near the village. Besides detailing the migration experience of the surveyed adults, the work stresses the changes in the nature of migration since the 1990s. The dataset is also unique in exploring the experiences of children who migrate, and of those left behind while their parents migrate.
Date: September 23, 2011
Time: 11:00 A.M.
Venue:
NCAER Conference Room
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Parisila Bhawan, 11, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Thursday, September 15, 2011
22 September 2011: Performance of the PDS: Evidence from Secondary Data and the Field
Reetika Khera
Indian Institute of Technology
Abstract:
Looking beyond national averages at state level indicators, one finds that the PDS is witnessing a revival in several states. Based on secondary data from the NSS, it looks at rates of "diversion" of grain from the PDS over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 period. Given the large variations in state-level performance on key parameters such as entitlements, diversion rates, quality of grain, accessibility and so on, one finds that it is misleading to talk about the PDS in terms of national averages. The results of a nine-state field study of the PDS undertaken in June 2011 further substantiate the revival of the PDS in several states. Some explanations for why the PDS functions in some states and is languishing in others are offered. I will also report on respondents views on cash transfers as an alternative to the PDS, and why they preferred one or the other.
Date: September 22, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Indian Institute of Technology
Abstract:
Looking beyond national averages at state level indicators, one finds that the PDS is witnessing a revival in several states. Based on secondary data from the NSS, it looks at rates of "diversion" of grain from the PDS over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 period. Given the large variations in state-level performance on key parameters such as entitlements, diversion rates, quality of grain, accessibility and so on, one finds that it is misleading to talk about the PDS in terms of national averages. The results of a nine-state field study of the PDS undertaken in June 2011 further substantiate the revival of the PDS in several states. Some explanations for why the PDS functions in some states and is languishing in others are offered. I will also report on respondents views on cash transfers as an alternative to the PDS, and why they preferred one or the other.
Date: September 22, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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Tuesday, September 13, 2011
16 September 2011: Professional Advice from Randomly Transparent Committees
Saptarshi P. Ghosh
University of Birmingham
Abstract:
This paper studies voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret committee where voting profiles get `leaked' to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on truthful (or informative) voting and the social welfare from committee decisions. We show that for informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient to have both random transparency and the unanimity voting rule provided that the common prior is not too informative and the transparency probability is intermediate. We then show that no committee that maximises social welfare can enforce informative voting, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable. We then show that with a low prior (the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any unanimous committee.
Date: September 16, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
University of Birmingham
Abstract:
This paper studies voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret committee where voting profiles get `leaked' to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on truthful (or informative) voting and the social welfare from committee decisions. We show that for informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient to have both random transparency and the unanimity voting rule provided that the common prior is not too informative and the transparency probability is intermediate. We then show that no committee that maximises social welfare can enforce informative voting, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable. We then show that with a low prior (the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any unanimous committee.
Date: September 16, 2011
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Venue:
Seminar Room 2, New Building
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)
Location:
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Friday, September 9, 2011
15 September 2011: Have Patience, Its Good
Amit Goyal
Indian Statistical Institute
Abstract:
In this paper we model a consumer who is ex ante unaware of his preferences over the set of alternatives and who can learn his preference by trying those alternatives one by one. He has a discount factor which prevents him from experimenting forever. Higher the patience level of the consumer, bigger will be the experimentation period and the more he will learn about his preferences. We then introduce firms in the model which will provide these alternatives with the aim to maximize profits. This paper is an attempt to answer how is this number of alternatives provided related with the average patience level of the agents in the economy.
Date: September 15, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
View Larger Map
Indian Statistical Institute
Abstract:
In this paper we model a consumer who is ex ante unaware of his preferences over the set of alternatives and who can learn his preference by trying those alternatives one by one. He has a discount factor which prevents him from experimenting forever. Higher the patience level of the consumer, bigger will be the experimentation period and the more he will learn about his preferences. We then introduce firms in the model which will provide these alternatives with the aim to maximize profits. This paper is an attempt to answer how is this number of alternatives provided related with the average patience level of the agents in the economy.
Date: September 15, 2011
Time: 03:00 P.M.
Venue:
AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor),
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)
Location:
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