31 January 2011: Business Cycle Facts and DSGE Model for India

Organised by: Macro/Finance group at NIPFP. Conference program.

Date: January 31, 2010
Time: 10:00 A.M.

Venue:
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
18/2 Satsang Vihar Marg, Special Institutional Area,
New Delhi-110067(INDIA)


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Critical Perspectives on China’s Economic Transition

Anthony D'Costa

Copenhagen Business School

Abstract
This presentation is based on a synthesis of two projects currently underway on globalization and economic nationalism in Asia and transformation of China and India. The talk covers a wide canvas covering China’s emergence in the world economy in the twenty-first century from an economic, social, and political points of views. It gives credit where credit is due but also indicates the tremendous challenges it faces. The approach is Socratic, raising more questions than offering answers and comparative, keeping India’s and other East Asian countries’ development experience in the background.

Date: January 27, 2011 

Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) , 

IDSA Campus Delhi

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Innovation and the Dynamics of Global Warming

Ralph Winter

University of British Columbia

Abstract
(1) Global warming and greenhouse gases are a dynamic system with positive feedback effects. 

(2) Fossil fuels are an exhaustible resource. These two facts mean that in the most basic of models, innovation in clean energy technology makes the global warming problem worse, not better. This paper explores the impact of innovation and its interaction with carbon taxes in the simplest model linking the theory of exhaustible resources with the dynamics of global warming.

Date: January 28, 2011 

Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2, 

ISI Delhi

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The Effects of Capital Market Openness on Exchange Rate Pass-through and Welfare in an Inflation-Targeting Small Open Economy

Sanchita Mukherjee

University of California, Santa Cruz

Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of capital market openness on exchange rate pass-through and subsequently on the social loss function in an inflation-targeting small open economy under a pure commitment policy. Applying the intuition behind the macroeconomic trilemma, the author examines whether a more open capital market in an inflation targeting country improves the credibility of the central bank and consequently reduces exchange rate pass-through. First, the effect of capital openness on exchange rate pass-through is empirically examined using a New Keynesian Phillips curve. The empirical investigation reveals that limited capital openness leads to greater pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic inflation, which raises the marginal cost of deviation from the inflation target. This subsequently worsens the inflation output-gap trade-off and increases the social loss of the inflation targeting central bank under pure commitment. However, the calibration results suggest that the inflation output-gap trade-off improves and the social loss decreases even in the presence of larger exchange rate pass-through if the capital controls are effective at insulating the exchange rate from interest rate and risk-premia shocks.

Date: January 25, 2011 

Time: 3:30 P.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2, 

ISI Delhi

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Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools

Nancy Gallini
University of British Columbia

Abstract
Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly infringement litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents to have pro-competitive benefits in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of costly infringement suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream innovation markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents. Special attention is given to the U.S. Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its application to recent patent pool cases.


Date: January 28, 2011 
Time: 3:00 P.M.


Venue:
New Seminar Room [First Floor]
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics


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